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ARTICLES 
JUDICIAL INDIFFERENCE TO 
PORNOGRAPHY'S HARM: 
AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS v. 
HUDNUT 
PENELOPE SEATOR* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
By an amendment to its civil rights ordinance, Indianapolis 
enacted a civil rights anti-pornography law that created private 
causes of action for injuries done through the production and 
use of pornography.1 This ordinance is the first law to define 
pornography for what it is - the subordination of women, a prac-
tice of sex discrimination - and to recognize and provide a rem-
edy for the real and substantial harms women, children, and 
men suffer through pornography's production and consumption. 
The law would provide a remedy for sex-based harms done 
through pornography to those coerced into pornographic per-
formances, those who have pornography forced on them, those 
* B.A., J.D. University of Illinois. I wish to thank Pauline Bart, Loretta Hintz, 
Catharine MacKinnon and Annie McCombs for helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper. I also thank the many women and those men whose work against pornogra-
phy has made it possible to understand and say that pornography is a form of sexual 
abuse, not a form of freedom. My debt to the groundbreaking work of Andrea Dworkin 
and Catharine MacKinnon will be apparent to anyone familiar with their work. 
1. Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 24, ch. 16 (amended May 
I, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Indianapolis Gen. Ordinance]. The ordinance was amended 
by Indianapolis, Ind., City-County General Ordinance No. 35 (June 15, 1984). The ordi-
nance was based on a model civil rights anti-pornography ordinance conceived and 
drafted by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon. The model ordinance is re-
printed in Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. I, 25 app. (1985) [hereinafter cited as The Male Flood]. 
297 
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who are assaulted in a way directly caused by a specific piece of 
pornography, and those who are injured by trafficking in pornog-
raphy.2 The ordinance recognizes for the first time that the 
harm of pornography is sexual abuse and the violation of 
women's civil rights. The ordinance is an important departure 
from the concept, purpose and effect of laws that attempt to reg-
ulate some sexually explicit material under the rubric of 
obscenity.3 
After groundbreaking theoretical work and factual inquiry 
in the ordinance's development and defense,· and widespread 
publicity and debate, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed5 a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuitS declaring the ordinance unconstitutional as a violation of 
the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution.7 The Court's sum-
mary adjudication of the case followed a series of legislative ini-
tiatives in several cities throughout the United States to enact 
civil rights laws substantially similar to the Indianapolis ordi-
nance.8 Despite the importance and magnitude of the harms the 
2. Indianapolis Gen. Ordinance §§ 16-4(a)(4), (5), (6), and (7). 
3. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
4. See, e.g., Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality: The Minneapolis Pornography 
Ordinance, 2 L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRACTICE 629 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
The Sexuality of Inequality]; Dworkin, The Male Flood, supra note 1; Donnerstein, 
Champion, Sunstein & MacKinnon, Pornography: Social Science, Legal, and Clinical 
Perspectives, 4 L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRACTICE 17 (1986) (remarks of C. MacK-
innon at 38-49) [hereinafter cited as Social Science, Legal, and Clinical Perspectives]; 
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. CR-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) 
(reprinted in C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 163 
(1987) as Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech) [hereinafter 
cited as Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech]; MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE 
L. & POL'y REV. 321 (1984); C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (Section III: "Pornog-
raphy"). Andrea Dworkin's definitive work on pornography, A DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: 
MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979) [hereinafter cited as PORNOGRAPHY], was published 
before the ordinance was conceived and drafted. See also, Benson, Pornography and the 
First Amendment: American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 153 (1986); 
Gershel, Evaluating a Proposed Civil Rights Approach to Pornography: Legal Analysis 
as if Women Mattered, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 41 (1985); Spahn, On Sex and Vio-
lence, 20 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 629 (1984-1985); Lahey, The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Pornography: Toward a Theory of Actual Gender Equality, 20 NEW ENG-
LAND L. REV. 649 (1984-1985); Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Val-
ues, 98 HARv. L. REV. 460 (1984). 
5. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 106 S. Ct. 1772 (1986), reh. den. 106 
S. Ct. 1664 (1986). 
6. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
8. A version of the civil rights anti-pornography ordinance was first introduced by a 
2
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ordinance addresses,9 the level of public interest it has gener-
ated, and the new and complex legal issues raised by the ordi-
nance,10 the Court disposed of the case without full briefing, 
without argument, without giving reasons for its decision and 
without even a citation to existing case law. 
The two lower courts that considered the constitutionality 
of the ordinance, the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of Indianall and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit,t2 although they gave reasons for their decisions, incom-
pletely and inadequately considered the constitutional ques-
tions. Finding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that it is viewpoint discrimination;13 the district court 
held that the interest in free· speech outweighs the interest in 
December 30, 1983 amendment to the Mfnneapolis civil rights ordinance. Minneapolis, 
Minn., Code of Ordinances, Title 7, ch. 139 (1982). The amendment was reintroduced 
January 13, 1984 after the mayor's January 5, 1984 veto. The Minneapolis City Council 
passed an amended version of the ordinance on July 13, 1984, which the mayor vetoed on 
the date it was enacted. A similar ordinance was introduced in Los Angeles, and in No-
vember, 1985 a civil rights anti-pornography referendum was rejected by less than 4,000 
votes in Cambridge, Massachusetts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at A16, col. 6. 
9. Before the Minneapolis version of the ordinance was enacted, the Minneapolis 
City Council Committee on Government operations held extensive hearings in which vic-
tims of pornography and those who work with victims testified to the harm inflicted 
through pornography. Public Hearings on Ordinances to Add Pornography as Discrimi-
nation Against Women, Committee on Government Operations, City Council, Minneap-
olis, Minn. (Dec. 12-13, 1983) (available from Pornography Resource Center, 734 East 
Lake Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 55407) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The testi-
mony also included social science evidence of pornograhy's harm. See infra text accom-
panying notes 160-169. 
10. In a letter dated January 8, 1984 addressed to Minneapolis City Council Mem-
ber Charlee Hoyt in response to Mayor Donald M. Fraser's veto of the ordinance, Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe said: 
While many hard questions of conflicting rights will face any 
court that confronts challenges to the ordinance, as drafted it 
rests on a rationale that closely parallels many previously ac-
cepted exceptions to justly stringent First Amendment guar-
antees. While remaining uncertain myself as to the ultimate 
outcome of a judicial test, I urge you not to allow an executive 
to prevent the courts from adjudicating what may eventually 
be found to be the first sensible approach to an area which has 
vexed some of the best legal minds for decades. 
Letter from Professor Laurence Tribe to Minneapolis City Council Member Charlee 
Hoyt (January 8, 1984) (on file with G.G.u. L. REV.). Unfortunately, the courts that con-
sidered the Indianapolis ordinance's constitutionality did not adequately consider the 
"hard questions." See infra Section II. 
11. American Booksellers Ass'n., Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
12. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
13. [d. at 325, 328. 
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sex-based equality.14 Because the plaintiffslG brought suit prior 
to any application of the ordinance, the courts decided the case 
in an abstract posture, before any state court construction of the 
law, and thus in a context that precluded a full and realistic con-
sideration of the issues.16 Neither court appeared to fully under-
stand the ordinance and, consequently, each wrote an opinion 
that considered the constitutionality of an imagined law, not the 
law Indianapolis enacted. Throughout the decisions, both courts 
incorrectly stated the terms of the ordinance, giving the appear-
ance of a careless and cavalier consideration of the important 
issues the ordinance raises and the serious harms the civil rights 
approach is designed to remedy. Both courts avoided the diffi-
cult issues, sidestepping them to rely on first amendment abso-
lutist doctrine and method that is neither true to existing Su-
preme Court decisions nor dispositive of the issues raised by the 
actual provisions of the ordinance. Neither court seriously con-
sidered the meaning and effect of the definition and regulation 
of pornography as a practice of sex discrimination, and neither 
court took seriously the massive harms clearly demonstrated in 
the legislative record. 
The ordinance defines pornography as "the graphic sexually 
explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in 
words" that also includes one or more of six specific presenta-
tions.17 Those presentations are: women "presented as sexual ob-
jects who enjoy pain or humiliation"; women "presented as sex-
ual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped"; 
women "presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or muti-
lated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or trun-
cated or fragmented or severed into body parts"; women 
'~presented as being penetrated by objects or animals"; women 
14. 598 F. Supp. at 1336. 
15. The plaintiffs were producers, distributors and readers or viewers of books, 
magazines and films. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 326. 
16. Serious standing issues were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. 771 F.2d at 327; 
598 F.Supp at 1328. Those issues, despite their importance, will not be considered here. 
In addition, this article will not consider the issues of state action; ripeness, abstention, 
vagueness, overbreadth, and prior restraint addressed iQ the litigation. Note, however, 
that the 7th Circuit did not find the ordinance vague or a prior restraint and neither 
court found it overbroad. 771 F.2d at 332; 598 F. Supp. at 1339-40. The 7th Circuit was 
wrong when it stated that the district court found the ordinance overbroad. 771 F.2d 
326. 
17. Indianapolis Gen. Ordinance, § 16-3(q). 
4
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"presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt in a 
context that makes these conditions sexual"; and women 
"presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, 
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions 
of servility or submission or display."l8 The ordinance provides 
that the "use of men, children or transsexuals in the place of 
women . . . shall also constitute pornography . . . ."19 
After defining pornography, the ordinance creates four 
causes of action on behalf of persons who have been injured 
through pornography. These are assault, coercion, forcing and 
trafficking. Persons assaulted in a way directly caused by specific 
pornography,20 persons coerced into pornographic perform-
ances,21 and persons injured by trafficking in pornography may 
recover against the perpetrators, makers, sellers, exhibitors or 
distributors.22 In the case of trafficking, any woman may file a 
complaint as a woman acting against the subordination of 
women, and any man, child or transsexual may file a complaint 
"but must prove injury in the same way that a woman is injured 
in order to obtain relief. "23 A person who has pornography 
forced on her or him in any place of employment, in education, 
in a home, or in any public place may recover against the perpe-
trators and the institution in which the forcing occurred.24 There 
is no cause of action for trafficking pornography that presents 
women as "sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, 
exploitation, possession or use or through postures or positions 
of servility, submission or display."21i The ordinance provides for 
18. [d. at § lS-3(q)(1)-(S). 
19. [d. at § lS-3(q). 
20. [d. at § lS-3(g)(7). 
21. [d. at § lS-3(g)(5). 
22. [d. at § lS-3(g)(4). 
23. [d. at § lS-17(b). 
24. [d. at § lS-3(g)(S); [d. at § lS-17(a)(7). 
25. [d. at § lS-3(g)(8); [d. at § lS-3(q)(S). The ordinance makes the following provi-
sion concerning defenses: 
Where the materials which are the subject matter of a com-
plaint under paragraphs (4), (5), (S), or (7) of this subsection 
(g) are pornography, it shall not be a defense that the respon-
dent did not know or intend that the materials were pornogra-
phy or sex discrimination; provided, however, that in the cases 
under paragraph (g)(4) of section lS-3 or against a seller, ex-
hibitor or distributor under paragraph (g)(7) of section lS-3, 
no damages or compensation for losses shall be recoverable 
5
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damages and injunctive relief for proven harm.26 
This paper will evaluate the opinions of the district court 
and the Seventh Ciruit that held the ordinance violated the first 
amendment, with particular attention to the courts' treatment of 
the demonstrated harms of pornography (II). The paper argues 
that pornography is a practice of discrimination through which 
women are subordinated on the basis of sex (III). When pornog-
raphy is understood in the context of social reality, it is seen as a 
practice of sex discrimination, just as racial segregation is un-
derst09d ru;; a practice of race discrimination when it and its 
meaning are seen in the context of a white supremacist society. 
Like all discrimination laws, the ordinance reaches practices of 
discrimination that are done in part through words or pictures 
and that construct the social definition of women and men. Con-
sequently, if the ordinance violates the first amendment, so does 
all discrimination law. In response to the decision of the Seventh 
Circuit, the paper argues that the ordinance is not unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination because it is aimed at the harm 
of sex-based abuse and subordination, and not at the harm of an 
idea (IV): Finally, the courts' misapplications of first amend-
ment doctrine and method are considered in relation to the con-
struction of social reality, including through pornography, and in 
relation to their significance for the use of law as one tool for 
achieving sex equality (V). 
II. THE HUDNUT DECISIONS 
The decisions of both the district court and the 7th Circuit 
in American Booksellers Ass'n., Inc. v. Hudnut27 distort the 
terms of the ordinance, misapply existing first amendment doc-
trine and method, and erase pornography's demonstrated harm. 
The Seventh Circuit, trivializing the harm, treated it as a reason 
unless the complainant proves that the respondent knew or 
had reason to know that the materials were pornography. Pro-
vided, further, that it shall be a defense to a complaint under 
paragraph (g) of section 16-3 that the materials complained of 
are those covered only by paragraph (q)(6) of section 16-3. 
Id. at § 16-3(g)(8). 
26. Id .. at § 16-17(a), (b), (c). 
27. 598 F. Supp. 1316 (D.C. Ind. 1984), at/'d, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), at/'d. 
memo 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986). 
6
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to protect pornography, treating as viewpoint discrimination the 
element of the law aimed at sex discrimination.28 The district 
court, also trivializing pornography's harm, treated its assertion 
as a reason to disbelieve its reality, minimizing the harm by as-
!?uming that speech interests always outweigh equality inter-
ests.29 Both courts, each in its way, adopted a first amendment 
absolutist position. The district court wrote an absolutist opin-
ion by purporting to balance speech and equality interests but, 
in fact, holding that speech always outweighs equality. The 7th 
Circuit's opinion is absolutist in that the court failed entirely to 
balance speech and equality interests.3o 
The proper application of liberal legal method in the adju-
dication of Hudnut would require the categorization and balanc-
ing of competing interests in speech and equality. The balance 
would consider the specific interests served by pornography and 
those the ordinance serves, weighing pornography's value as 
speech against the harms of abuse and subordination done 
through assault, coercion, forcing and trafficking demonstrated 
in the legislative record. In this analysis, properly applied, the 
massive, demonstrated harms of the abuse done through pornog-
raphy and its limited first amendment value31 should lead to the 
conclusion that the ordinance is constitutional. Other less seri-
ous and much less fully demonstrated harms have justified lim-
its on first amendment interests.32 In the Hudnut litigation, the 
courts failed to respond to sexual harm to women as they have 
responded to other harms.33 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 73-100. 
29. See infra text accompanying notes 34-72. 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 73-100. 
31. For a discussion of pornography's limited first amendment value, see Sunstein, 
Pornography and the First Amendment, 4 DUKE L.J. 589, 602-08 (1986). 
32. These arguments are made in MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and 
Speech, supra note 4, at 26-31, 61-66. 
33. This paper will not focus specifically on the nature, extent, and demonstration 
of pornography's harms. Anyone who wishes to understand those harms should read the 
transcript of the hearings the Minneapolis City Council Government Operations Com-
mittee held before the City Council enacted a version of the civil rights anti-pornograhy 
ordinance there. See generally, Hearings, supra note 9. Others have written specifically 
on pornography's harms. See, e.g., Baldwin, The Sexuality of Inequality, supra note 4; 
A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 4; MacKinnon, Social Science, Clinical, and Le-
gal Perspectives, supra note 4; MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 
supra note 4. 
7
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The district court approached the question of the constitu-
tionality of the ordinance by stating, first, that pornography as 
defined is not conduct and, therefore, is "speech"34 Next, the 
court concluded that pornography is protected speech by deter-
mining that pornography does not fit into any established cate-
gory of unprotected speech,35 and concluded that pornography 
may not be regulated under the reasoning of New York v. Fer-
ber,36 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,37 or Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, Inc.,38 by attempting to distinguish the regula-
tions upheld in thqse cases from the Indianapolis ordinance.39 
Finally, the court determined that speech interests always out-
weigh the interest in sex equality!O 
The court's decision is filled with misconceptions about and 
misstatements of the terms of the ordinance. The court stated, 
incorrectly, that the city of Indianapolis had adopted the posi-
tion that pornography is conduct!l The court apparently failed 
to understand the city's argument that pornography is a practice 
of sex discrimination because it actively subordinates women, 
and also children and men, on the basis of sex when they are 
abused through pornography by assault, coercion, forcing and 
traflickipg. The court, instead, in determining that pornography 
is "speech" and not "conduct", misquoted, with emphasis, a cen-
tral term of the definition of pornography, ruling as though the 
law said that pornography is "the sexually explicit subordination 
of women, graphically depicted. "42 Rather than confront the ac-
tual terms of the ordinance, and the city's argument that por-
nography is a practice of sex discrimination, the court asserted, 
without reasoning, that pornography is speech and, therefore, 
not discrimination.43 The court posed the question within a 
34. 598 F. Supp. 1330-33. 
35. [d. at 1331-32. 
36. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
37. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
38. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
39. 598 F. Supp. at 1332-35. 
40. [d. at 1335-37. 
41. [d. at 1330. The defendant city did not argue that pornography is conduct in the 
first amendment doctrinal sense. 
42. [d. at 1330. The court quoted the ordinance as it read before the June, 1984 
amendment. See supra note 1. 
43. 598 F. Supp. at 1330. "They contend (one senses with a certain sleight of hand) 
that the production, dissemination, and use of sexually explicit words and pictures is the 
actual subordination of women and not an expression of ideas deserving of First Amend-
8
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closed world that it apparently imagined to be the world of first 
amendment jurisprudence. It set the parameters of the analyti-
cal possibilities by assuming that pornography is either "speech" 
or "conduct", in the first amendment doctrinal sense, without 
allowing even the possibility that pornography is something else: 
sex discrimination. The court's approach ignored the actual con-
ception of the ordinance and the arguments of its proponents, 
and distorted and misused the first amendment conduct 
doctrine.44 
Throughout its opinion, the court stated that the ordinance 
"outlaws","G forbids,"6 bans,"? prohibits,"8 and proscribes49 por-
nography.GO The court, for the most part, simply ignored what is 
actionable under the ordinance: assault, coercion, forcing and 
trafficking and, in a similar vein, assserted that "the Ordinance 
does not presume or require specifically defined, identifiable vic-
tims for most of its proscriptions."Gl One assertion among these, 
that the ordinance does not presume victims, is correct. The leg-
islative record demonstrates pornography's harm, and harm 
must be established before liability is imposed. The other asser-
tions are false. The ordinance, far from outlawing or banning or 
prohibiting anything, except insofar as it might be correct to de-
scribe enjoining proven abuse and subordination as "banning", 
and far from failing to require identifiable victims, provides a 
remedy to those victimized by specified acts done through por-
ment protection." [d. The court stated that it accepted the legislative finding that por-
nography causes sex discrimination. [d. at 1330, 1335. It apparently failed to compre-
hend, however, the legislative finding that pornography is, and the definition of 
pornography as, sex discrimination. 
44. The court used the first amendment concept of "conduct" as a way to determine 
that pornography is speech without confronting the argument in support of the ordi-
nance. The court posited that pornography is either speech or conduct and, by conclud-
ing that it is not conduct, concluded that it is speech. It is not true, however, that 
whatever is not conduct is speech. The conduct doctrine is a doctrine, however unsup-
portable, that permits finding that speech interests are implicated even though the court 
sees more action than it sees words and pictures. See L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW at 598-601 (1978). 
45. 598 F. Supp. at 1327, 1330 
46. [d. at 1327. 
47. [d. at 1328, 1331. 
48. [d. at 1334, 1335. 
49. [d. at 1335. 
50. The idea that the ordinance "bans" or "outlaws" pornography is both an asser-
tion that is good business for the pornographers and informed by their point of view. 
Pornography is sexually exciting in part because it is perceived as sex that is not allowed. 
51. 598 F. Supp. at 1335. 
9
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nography. Harm must be proven on two levels for liability to be 
imposed. First, it must be established that the materials in ques-
tion are pornography, which requires establishing, along with 
the other elements of the definition, that they subordinate on 
the basis of sex. Subordination is an injury. Second, it must be 
established that a particular woman, child, man or transsexual is 
injured by assault, coercion or forcing before liability is imposed 
for those acts. The trafficking provision, to which, perhaps, the 
court referred with the phrase "most of [the ordinance's] pro-
scriptions", requires that injury to women as a group be estab-
lished in particular cases by establishing that the material in 
question subordinates women. A child, man or transsexual must 
prove that s/he is injured in the same way that a woman is in-
jured. The plaintiff in a trafficking action is both "specifically 
defined" and "identifiable." 
The court's assertion that the ordinance bans pornography 
is consistent with its characterization of the ordinance as afford-
ing "protection"52 when the ordinance in fact provides redress 
for proven harms. The ordinance provides a remedy for harm 
done to women, and also children, men and transsexuals, as te-
nants are provided remedies for retaliation or wrongful eviction, 
or persons are provided civil remedies for abuses inflicted by the 
police or others acting under color of law, or workers are pro-
vided remedies for wrongful discharge. These remedies are un-
derstood as remedies. When, however, women were provided a 
remedy for sexual harm and abuse, the court termed the remedy 
"protection" and compared it with the protection ostensibly pro-
vided children by law, implying that the remedy itself disadvan-
tages women by treating women like children. 53 In contrasting 
52. [d. at 1333, 1334, 1335. 
53. Why is providing a remedy to women for proven harm seen as protection that 
disadvantages women? The question is closely related to another question: Why is recog-
nizing the extent to which women are injured as women condemned as turning women 
into victims by embracing women's victimization? It is in the interests of many, includ-
ing men as a class and, at least on one level, including women who enjoy, however pre-
cariously, male privilege, to keep down women as a group. If the reality and extent of the 
injuries to women as women were recognized, and if women had the tools, including the 
legal tools, with which to end those injuries, women would begin to end sexual abuse and 
subordination. If saying it made it so, women could achieve equality by saying it exists, 
and create victimization by recognizing its existence. The denial of the extent to which 
women are injured as women is, in part, an expression of the pain and despair that the 
reality is capable of engendering. To change an injurious reality, it is necessary to change 
what actually is, not merely assert what one wishes were. Why, when, for instance, recog-
10
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the criminal law concerning child pornography upheld in Ferber 
with the ordinance, the court proceeded as though the relevant 
question were whether, under law and public policy established 
before the ordinance created new law and public policy, adult 
women are in need of the same protection afforded children.1I4 In 
fact, however, the question is whether the legislative record 
demonstrates that women, and also children, men and transsex-
uals, who are injured by assault, coercion, forcing or trafficking 
in pornography should have redress for their injuries. 
Although the court stated that pornography is "harmful ... 
and inimical to and inconsistent with enlightened approaches to 
equality",1111 it treated pornography's active subordination as 
"depiction",116 labeled its harm "offense",117 and distinguished 
pornography's harm from "real social harm. "118 Although the 
court stated that it accepted as true the legislative finding that 
pornography "conditions society to subordinate women",119 it ap-
parently failed to comprehend the argument that pornography is 
sex discrimination and did not recognize the harm of subordi-
nating women as a real harm. The harms that the legislative rec-
ord establishes are serious, widespread, and real, meaning that 
real people, principally women, are actually harmed through 
pornography by assault, coercion, forcing and trafficking. 
The court apparently did not understand the nature of the 
harms for which the ordinance provides redress. When the court 
compared the ordinance with the regulations upheld in Pacifica 
it contrasted the invasion of the seven dirty words broadcast 
over the radio with pornography. The court apparently saw real 
harm in Pacifica's seven dirty words because the radio" 'in-
vades' the privacy of the home" where the" 'individual's right to 
be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an 
nizing the horror of the abuses, tortures and murders in EI Salvador, Guatemala, South 
Africa and other countries is understood as the first step in changing them, is recognizing 
the sexual abuse, torture and murder of women in order to change it an act that victim-
izes women? If women were ideas or images or fantasies, as in the point of view con-
structed by pornography woman are, saying women are victimized might make it so. 
54. 598 F. Supp. at 1333-34. 
55. ld. at 1327. 
56. ld. at 1327, 1330, 1331, 1333, 1334, 1335. 
57. ld. at 1327, 1331, 1334. 
58. ld. at 1327. 
59. ld. at 1330. 
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intruder.' "80 'The court apparently believed it is more difficult to 
flip the switch on a radio than it is for a woman, or a child, to 
avoid having pornography forced on her in her home. Radio di-
als are generally more easily managed than adult men deter-
mined to impose sexual abuse. The court, however, concluded 
that, although the difficulty of turning off the radio and the con-
sequent invasion of the privacy of the home warranted the regu-
lation in Pacifica, the subordination, invasion, use and abuse of 
women and children through pornography by assault, coercion, 
forcing and trafficking do not warrant regulation of pornogra-
phy. This is so because, the court asserted, in the face of a legis-
lative record that proves the assertion false, "[a]dult women 
generally have the capacity to protect themselves from partici-
pating in or being personally victimized by pornography .... "81 
The court also failed to recognize that the ordinance vindicates a 
woman's "right to be left alone" in her home by creating a cause 
of action for forcing pornography on a person in specified places, 
including in a home.82 Those victimized by sexual assault surely 
are not being "left alone." 
As the court failed to understand the nature of the harms 
for which the ordinance provides redress, it failed also to recog-
60.Id. 
61. Id. The court created a unique standard for determining whether injured per-
sons are entitled to redress for their injuries. In the court's formulation, women are not 
entitled to redress for pornography's harm if women generally can avoid its harm. It is 
difficult to imagine such a standard applied to those injured in automobile accidents, or 
those mugged on the street (assuming that the mugging is not a sexual assault). The 
court's standard would require that those who would recover for injury must show that 
- most others similarly situated have also been harmed. Ironically, sexual harm to women 
may be one of the few instances in which such a proof is possible. See, e.g., S. BROWNMIL-
LER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); L. CLARK & D. LEWIS, RAPE: THE 
PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY (1977); D. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982); K. BARRY, 
FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979); A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 
(1979); L. LOVELACE & M. MCGRADY, ORDEAL (1980); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON 
PORNOGRAPHY (L. Lederer ed. 1980); C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN (1979); R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST THE 
PATRIARCHY (1979); D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1981); L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WO-
MAN (1979). See generally, Hearings supra note 9. 
62. Indianapolis Gen. Ordinance, supra note 1, § 16-3(g)(4). See MacKinnon, Pri-
vacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4, at 93 for 
an analysis of privacy doctrine that can make sense of the district court's apparent fail-
ure in Hudnut to comprehend the reality of the sexual abuse of women and children in 
homes. See also, Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Development of a 
Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1 L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY 
& PRACTICE 191 (1983). 
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nize the identity of the victims whose rights the ordinance would 
provide the means to vindicate. In considering the relationship 
between the regulation upheld in Pacifica and the ordinance, the 
court asserted that the ordinance "is not written to protect chil-
dren .... "63 Similarly, throughout its discussion of Ferber, the 
court proceeded as though the ordinance did not provide a rem-
edy to children injured by assault, coercion, forcing or traffick-
ing.64 The assertion and the assumption are simply false.611 
In the court's analysis, the harm of pornography is unreal,66 
irrelevant,67 or self-imposed.68 The court, despite its statement 
that harm was irrelevant to its decision, concluded that women 
who are victimized by pornography are to blame for the victimi-
zation.69 In fact, the court, in its version of the slippery slope -
its only articulated reason for finding that speech interests out-
weigh equality interests - saw those whose injuries would be re-
dressed by the ordinance as aggressors, with the pornographers 
apparently cast as victims.70 The court also stated that speech 
should be most vigorously protected against those who assert 
they are harmed through words or pictures, as though the fact 
that a person is victimized is reason to deny her redress in the 
face of competing first amendment interests: 
To permit every interest group, especially those 
who claim to be victimized by unfair expression, 
their own legislative exceptions to the First 
Amendment so long as they succeed in obtaining 
a majority of legislative votes in their ,favor dem-
onstrates the potentially predatory nature of 
what defendants seek through this Ordinance and 
defend in this lawsuit.71 
63. 598 F. Supp. at 1334. 
64. [d. at 1332-34. 
65. See Indianapolis Gen. Ordinance, supra note 1, at §§ 16-1(a)(2); 16-3(q); 16-
17(a), (b). 
66. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
67. 598 F. Supp. at 1333, 1337. 
68. [d. at 1334. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 1337. 
71. [d. (emphasis supplied). See Dworkin, The Male Flood, supra note 4, at 23 
("We come to the legal system beggars: though in the public dialogue around the passage 
of this civil rights law we have the satisfaction of being regarded as thieves.") The court's 
comments demonstrate its disregard of the legislative record and findings of pornogra-
phy's serious and massive harms. 
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The district court, although stating that it accepted the legisla-
tive finding that pornography causes sex discrimination, denied 
harm as unreal, trivialized it as offense, blamed it on pornogra-
phy's victims, and deemed its assertion an act of aggression. It 
did this while purporting to leave the legislative record 
undisturbed.'12 
The Seventh Circuit, like the district court, erased the real-
ity of pornography's harm as the justification for the ordinance, 
simultaneously trivializing it'13 and asserting it as a demonstra-
tion that pornography is protected speech.'14 Like the district 
court, the Seventh Circuit assumed away in its analysis the stat-
utory definition of pornography as sex discrimination, although, 
unlike the district court, it purported to accept the statutory 
definition. '111 
The Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional because its definition of pornography is unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination. The court, nevertheless, repeatedly 
left out or distorted one or more elements of the definition. '16 
Consequently, the court considered it possible that the defini-
tion would apply to W.B. Yeats' "Leda and the Swan", Homer's 
Illiad, and James Joyce's Ulysses. The court failed to analyze 
these works under the actual terms of the ordinance, and conse-
quently, by suggesting, without deciding, that these works may 
be covered, created the impression that the ordinance is vast 
and sweeping. '1'1 
The court's failure to properly apply the ordinance's defini-
tion of pornography accounts for much of its mistaken analysis. 
Although the court stated that the ordinance defines pornogra-
phyas a practice'18 and as subordination,'19 it undercut and, ulti-
72. 598 F. Supp. at 1337. 
73. 771 F.2d at 329. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 324, 328, 329. 
76. [d. at 325, 328. 
77. [d. at 325, 327. The idea that "Leda and the Swan" is sexually explicit is totally 
unfounded. Interpenetrating gyres, blasted oaks, love having "pitched its mansion in / 
the place of excrement" because nothing "can be sole or whole / that has not been rent", 
"thighs caressed", and "helpless breast" are as close to sexually explicit as Yeats gets. 
"Explicit" means explicit, not implied, indicated or alluded to. 
78. 771 F.2d at 324, 329. 
79. [d. at 327, 329. 
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mately, negated in its analysis this recognition of the actual 
terms of the ordinance. The court did this in two ways. First, 
like the district court, the Seventh Circuit referred repeatedly to 
"depictions."8o It treated pornography as an "idea",81 as "ex-
pression",82 "belief',83 as "thought",84 "image",85 and "opin-
ion."88 Consequently, it assumed that the ordinance is concerned 
with truth and falsity,87 "approved" views,88 and the declaration. 
of the truth of "preferred viewpoints. "89 The court stated, for 
instance: "[T]herefore we accept the premises of this legislation. 
Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordina-
tion."90 The ordinance is not premised on a relationship between 
subordination and its depiction. By confusing depictions and 
practices, the court blurred the line between practices and ideas, 
and between subordination and the depiction of subordination, 
treating pornography, a practice of discrimination, as though it 
were indistinguishable from an idea, a thought, an opinion or a 
belief. Because the court all but obliterated the distinction be-
tween the two, it could say that it accepted that pornography is 
a practice and not an idea, while also saying that pornography is 
an idea, thought, and depiction. 
Second, the court purported to see much speech as though 
it were a practice. "If pornography is what it does, so is other 
speech."91 With a similar logic and apparently similar aim, the 
. court stated both that pornography depends on "mental inter-
mediation"92 and that sexual responses are often "unthinking re-
sponses", like, the court said, responses to "almost all cultural 
stimuli. "93 It is a contradiction to say pornography is a practice 
and that it is an idea, as it is a contradiction to say that pornog-
raphy depends on "mental intermediation" and that sexual re-
80. [d. at 325, 328, 329, 330, 331, n.3. 
81. [d. at 327, 328. 
82. [d. at 328. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. at 328, 329. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. at 327, 329. 
87. [d. at 330-331. 
88. [d. at 325, 328. 
89. [d. at 325. 
90. [d. at 329. 
91. [d. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. at 330. 
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sponses are "unthinking responses." It seems less important in 
the court's opinion whether the response to pornography is 
thinking or unthinking, and whether pornography is thought or 
practice, than that it should be indistinguishable from all that 
the first amendment protects.94 
The court treated the harm of pornography as trivial and as 
an argument for its protection. Although stating that it accepted 
the legislative finding of harm,95 the court trivialized the harm 
by referring to it as "unhappy consequences"96 and "unhappy 
effects."97 As it trivialized pornography's harm, the court treated 
the harm as a reason to protect pornography, rather than as the 
basis of the policy and constitutional arguments in support of 
the ordinance: "Yet [this harm] simply demonstrates the power 
of pornography as speech."98 Because the court turned the rea-
son and constitutional justification for the ordinance into an ar-
gument for pornography's protection, the court saw no interest 
competing with what it assumed to be the speech interests 
served by pornography. As the harm of pornography was an ar-
gument for its protection, so the subordination element of the 
law was, in the court's view, not a competing interest, but un-
constitutional viewpoint discrimination. The court's analysis 
swallowed up everything in the great maw of "speech", con-
verting discrimination into an idea, a sex equality law into a 
viewpoint, and harm into a constitutional justification for per-
petuating harm. 
Because the court recognized only one interest, which it cat-
egorized as speech, it did not find it necessary to balance com-
peting speech and equality interests. The court understood the 
equality provision of the law as an effort to regulate speech. The 
court's decision rested explicitly on first amendment absolutism: 
94. The court seemed to assume that to say that something constructs social reality 
is a practice is to say that it is a belief or an idea that is interwoven with a way of life, a 
world view, or processes of socialization. [d. at 329-330. The court seemed to make this 
assumption because it could not see that anything but ideas could construct social real-
ity. See infra section V. 
95. 771 F.2d at 329. 
96. [d. at 329, n.2. 
97. [d. at 329. It is such acts as rape, battery, child sexual abuse, prostitution, sexual 
harrassment and other abuse and discrimination that the court refers to by these 
phrases. 
98. [d. at 329. 
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Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on televi-
sion, reporters' biases - these and many more in-
fluence the culture and shape our socialization. 
None is directly answerable by more speech, un-
less that speech too finds its place in the popular 
culture. Yet all is protected as speech, however 
insidious. Any other answer leaves the govern-
ment in control of all of the institutions of cul-
ture, the great censor and director of which 
thoughts are good for US.99 
313 
The method the court employed is consistent with this absolu-
tist hyperbole. Because the court recognized no interest but a 
speech interest it gave no value to the compelling state interest 
in sex equality.loo 
Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit assumed 
their way to the decisions they rendered. Both courts assumed 
that pornography is speech and not discrimination. The proper 
characterization of pornography - as thought or idea, or as a 
practice of sex discrimination - was a central point of contention 
in the Hudnut litigation. Each court resolved it through assum-
ing pornography is speech and, therefore, not discrimination. 
For each court, this assumption determined the outcome. For 
the district court, the categorization determined Qutcome be-
. cause it concluded that the category of speech interests always, 
particularly when harm is asserted, outweighs the category of 
equality interests. For the Seventh Circuit, the categorization 
determined the outcome because it adopted an absolutist ap-
proach in which all speech must be protected or none will be, 
and by which the court accorded the compelling state interest in 
sex equality no weight. 
III. PORNOGRAPHY IS A PRACTICE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
The courts and some commentators who have considered 
the question of the constitutionality of the civil rights anti-por-
nography ordinance have dismissed, ignored or failed to compre-
hend the definition of pornography as a practice of sex discrimi-
99. [d. at 330 (emphasis supplied). 
100. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984). 
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nation.IOI Much analysis has proceeded as though the ordinance 
simply regulates speech, without comprehending the basis and 
implications of the statutory definition of pornography. The ar-
gument for the constitutionality of the civil rights ordinance 
rests on the harm done through pornography and the analysis 
that infliction of this harm, in all its forms, constitutes a practice 
of sex discrimination. There has been little argument in support 
of the position that pornography is not a practice of sex discrim-
ination. The assertion that pornography is speech and, therefore, 
not a practice, has ended the discussion in most cases.I02 It is 
possible, however, to glean what seem to be the outlines of two 
implicit assumptions that apparently lead to the conclusion that 
pornography, because it is speech, is not a practice. 
The first is simply that because pornography is words and 
pictures, it is not a practice. lOS The assumption is that a practice 
is done; words and pictures are, as though acts cannot be done 
through words and pictures. The fact that one can point, for in-
stance, to a book or a picture and say, truthfully, "That is por-
nography", seems to imply that pornography is not also a prac-
tice of sex discrimination. 
If one could isolate pornographic words and pictures and 
look at them one by one, out of the context of the world, out of 
the context of pornography's production and consumption in a 
system of male supremacy, it might seem plausible to say that 
pornography is not a practice because it is words and pictures. 
Similarly, if racial segregation could be taken out of context, iso-
lated from the reality of white supremacy and the practice of 
101. The failures, in addition to those of the district court and the Seventh Circuit 
in Hudnut, include Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Pro-
fessor MacKinnon, 3 YALE L. & POL. REV. 130, 137 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Reply to 
Professor MacKinnon). 
102. See, e.g., in addition to the Hudnut decisions, Emerson, Reply to Professor 
MacKinnon, supra note 101, at 137. The extent to which the opponents of the civil 
rights anti-pornography ordinance argue by mere assertion and proceed by assumption is 
a demonstration of Catharine MacKinnon's theory of epistomology and power. See, e.g., 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 
SIGNS 515 (1982) [hereinafter cited as An Agenda for Theory); MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Toward Feminist Jurisprudence); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil 
Rights and Speech, supra note 4. 
103. See, e.g., 598 F. Supp. at 1330-31; Emerson, Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 
supra note 101, at 137. 
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segregation, the fact that a white child went to one school and a 
Black child attended another might not be understood as race 
discrimination.l04 In isolation, outside the context of social real-
ity, segregation would be simply a fact about where each attends 
school, or which drinking fountain each uses, or where each sits 
on the bus. 1011 Outside the context of social reality, segregation is 
not race discrimination, because a practice of discrimination has 
meaning in the context of the social reality that it constructs 
and is constructed by. In the context of the production and use 
of pornography, in a context of social reality and male 
supremacy, pornography as defined in the ordinance is a prac-
tice of sex discrimination done through pictures and words, as 
segregation, in a context of white supremacy, is a practice of 
race discrimination. 
Segregation, on one level, is a physical fact, as pornography, 
on one level, is a physical object. As political and social reality, 
however, pornography is no less a practice of sex discrimination 
than segregation is a practice of race discrimination. The fact 
that physical facts and physical objects as such are not practices 
does not mean that as, social realities and social institutions, 
they are not ways in which discrimination is practiced under 
conditions of inequality.loB 
The second assumption that forms the foundation for the 
unreasoned rejection of the analysis of pornography as a practice 
104. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); See also Wechsler, Toward Neu-
tral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
Neutral Principles]. 
105. Because Wechsler considered segregated schools in the abstract and without 
relation to the realities of power under a system of white supremacy, he considered that 
segregated schools may benefit Black children, and that some Blacks may choose them. 
Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 104, at 33. He failed to consider what meaning 
"choice" might have in a context in which choice does not exist: Black children could not 
choose to go to white schools under the system of segregation. Doing, even with a posi-
tive attitude, what one is required to do is not choice. This is true even if one likes doing 
what is required. 
106. Words and pictures can be both obscenity and pornography. As obscenity, and 
from the viewpoint of obscenity law, they are the dirty, sexually arousing truth about sex 
that should be hidden. As pornography, they are a practice of sex discrimination. That 
is, pornography, like obscenity, is at a different level of meaning and abstraction from 
the physical object that may be either pornography or obscenity or both. Perhaps law-
yers will be convinced by a substantively irrelevant analogy: A school is a physical object: 
a building. It is also an institution. Although buildings, as such, are not institutions, a 
school is both. 
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of sex discrimintion is that if attitudes and behavior are af-
fected, they are affected by speech or ideas. The assumption is 
that social reality is, and is constructed solely by, speech and 
ideas. The Seventh Circuit relied on this assumption in its deci-
sion in Hudnut. 107 The constitutional defect of the ordinance, 
according to the 7th Circuit, is that it aims at the creation of 
social reality and, therefore, aims at expression, at speech.10B 
The court concluded that pornography is speech because it con-
structs social reality. The court failed to make two crucial dis-
tinctions: (1) between practices that construct social reality, in-
cluding constructing women and men as such,109 and the 
expression of a belief; and (2) between belief and social reality. 
The court proceeded as though, because pornography is central 
in constructing social reality, it is an idea, a thought, or a belief -
that it is "speech." By making these assumptions, the court im-
plicitly adopted a position of philosophical idealism. 
If pornography as defined in the civil rights anti-pornogra-
phy ordinance is not a practice of sex discrimination, nothing is. 
Most discrimination is done, in whole or in part, in words. All 
sex discrimination is expressive, and all contributes to the crea-
tion of a world in which women are, in fact, subordinated to men 
through practices of sex discrimination that depend on and rein-
force the belief that women are inferior to men. As race discrim-
ination expresses Black inferiority and creates a world in which 
Blacks are subordinated to whites, so sex discrimination ex-
presses women's inferiority as it simultaneously and inextricably 
subordinates on the basis of sex.l10 
107. 771 F.2d at 328-330. See infra section V. 
108. [d. at 329. 
109. See Mackinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, supra note 4, at 18: 
What pornography does goes beyond its content: It eroticizes 
hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and 
submission sex . . . . From this perspective, pornography is 
neither harmless fantasy nor a corrupt and confused misrepre-
sentation of an otherwise natural and healthy sexual situation. 
It institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing the 
eroticization of dominance and submission with the social con-
struction of of male and female. To the extent that gender is 
sexual, pornography is part of constituting the meaning of 
that sexuality. Men treat women as who they see women as 
being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over 
women means that the way men see women defines who 
women can be. 
110. See Brief of Andrea Dworkin, Amicus Curiae, Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, at 9. 
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Words, in almost every instance, play a crucial role in prac-
tices of discrimination. When, for example, race discrimination 
has been practiced as segregation, it often has been done primar-
ily through words - signs, spoken words, laws that have said 
where Blacks could eat, sit, drink, work, study, live. In addition, 
segregation has functioned also as a symbol, an expression of the 
subordination of Blacks to whites. Whether or not words are 
used in a particular instance of the practice of segregation, seg-
regation is expressive. A separate drinking fountain is a symbol 
of white supremacy, as is the requirement that Blacks sit in sep-
arate railway cars. The symbolic meaning of segregation is insep-
arable from its operation as race discrimination. Segregation 
means what it means - Blacks are inferior - as it does what it 
does - subordinates on the basis of race. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson,lll the Supreme Court held that seg-
regation is not race discrimination under the fourteenth amend-
ment, ruling that separate but equal is equal. Because the Court 
in Plessy understood the meaning of segregation to exist only in 
the construction that Blacks "choose to put upon it",ll2 it found 
that segregation was not discrimination. It was because the 
Court failed to formulate legal doctrine that comprehended the 
social meaning of the practice of segregation that it could hold it 
It is wrong to say ... that pornography as defined by the Or-
dinance expresses ideas and is therefore protected speech, un-
less one is prepared to say that murder or rape or torture with 
an ideology behind it also expresses ideas and might well be 
protected on that account. Most acts express ideas. Most sys-
tems of exploitation or inequality express ideas. Segregation 
expressed an idea more eloquently than any book about the 
inferiority of black people ever did. Yet the Supreme Court 
overturned segregation - after protecting it for a very long 
time - because the Court finally grasped its harm to peo-
ple • • . . The fact that the idea that segregation expressed 
would suffer because the idea required the practice for much 
of its persuasive power did not afford segregation constitu-
tional protection: attempts to invoke First Amendment justifi-
cations have been thoroughly repudiated. 
111. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
112. [d. 
[d. at 551. 
We consider the underlying fallacy ••. to consist in the as-
sumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps 
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is 
not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because 
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. 
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was not discrimination. Only when the act was seen to have a 
social meaning that affected the hearts and minds of Black chil-
dren did separate but equal cease to look equal, and did segrega-
tion begin to look like discrimination. 
In Brown v. Board of Education,1l3 the court understood 
that segregation operated as expression. Because it understood 
that segregation expressed a belief in Black inferiority, the 
Court understood it as race discrimination: "[T]o separate 
[Black children] from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."1l4 The Court 
upheld the finding that " 'the policy of separating the races is 
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro 
group.' "115 In Brown, the Court held that the meaning of segre-
gation harmed Black children on the basis of race and;therefore, 
was race discrimination. The fact that segregation was expres-
sive did not prevent the Court from seeing that it was also a 
practice of race discrimination. Far from preventing the conclu-
sion that segregation is discrimination, the expressive nature of 
segregation was a basis of the Court's holding that it is 
discrimination. 
Like race discrimination, sex discrimination is also expres-
sion. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,1l6 the Supreme Court 
held that the state's compelling interest in sex-based equality 
outweighed the first amendment rights of speech and association 
of an organization that excluded women from full membership. 
The Jaycees argued that admission of women as full members 
would infringe on their rights of association, impair the message 
conveyed by women's exclusion, and impair the members' 
speech interests by influencing the philosophical cast and public 
positions of the organization.1l7 The Jaycess argued that the ex-
clusion of women was expressive, symbolic - "speech" in the first 
amendment sense. The exclusion was, nevertheless, simultane-
ously a practice of sex discrimination. 
113. 347 u.S. 483 (1954). 
114. [d. at 494. 
115. [d. 
116. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
117. [d. at 617. 
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The practice of discrimination by the exclusion of women 
was speech in another sense. It, like most practices of discrimi-
nation,ll8 was done primarily through words. Women were ex-
cluded from full participation in the Jaycees by the organiza-
tion's national bylaws.lls Bylaws are words. The Jaycees did not 
act to exclude women by posting guards at the door of the club-
house.12o When the Jaycees said that a woman could not join 
because she was a woman, the words, in context of the power to 
make them eifective,l2l were sex discrimination. When the 
Jaycees uttered the words, excluding a woman from member-
ship, they practiced discrimination.122 The effect of the words, 
those in the bylaws and those uttered to an individual woman 
118. Or at least those recognized as such in law. Rape and woman battering, for 
instance, two central practices by which women are subordinated on the basis of sex, are 
not actionable as sex discrimination, except when they come within the law of sexual 
harrassment. Rape and battery are done less with words and more with acts than other 
practices of sex discrimination. They are, nonetheless, expressive. 
119. 468 U.S. at 615. 
120. In Roberts, two local chapters of the Jaycees had admitted women, with the 
result that the national organization imposed sanctions on the locals. The sanctions in-
cluded denying members eligibility for state or national office or awards programs, and 
refusing to count their membership when counting votes at national conventions. Offices 
and awards are given with words, and voting is done through words. Members of the 
local chapters filed discrimination charges after receiving notice (in words, no doubt) 
that the national organization planned to consider (presumably in words) a motion (also 
words) to revoke the local chapters' charters (words). 
121. See the comments of Sheila McIntyre in Feminist Ethical Approaches to the 
First Amendment, Panel Discussion at the 17th National Conference on Women and the 
Law at 18, 19 (March 22, 1986) [hereinafter cited as McIntyre, Feminist Ethical Ap-
proaches) (transcript on file with G.G.U. L. REV.). 
122. Id. If a man who had no authority in the Jaycees told a woman that she could 
not join because she was a woman, and if he, further, advocated women's exclusion from 
men's clubs on principle, he would lack power to effect his words. They would be speech; 
they would advocate women's exclusion and argue for women's inferiority. They would 
not be a practice of sex discrimination. 
Men, simply as men under conditions of male supremacy, have the power to effect 
women's subordination through sex, including through pornography. If a man forces por-
nography on a woman, he is doing more than advocating her subordination: he subordi-
nates and abuses her. If he coerces a woman into a pornographic performance, or sexu-
ally assaults a woman, including in a way directly caused by a specific piece of 
pornography, or if he trafficks in pornography, the man is not simply saying that she is 
subordinate to him as a woman and is the appropriate object of abuse: he abuses and 
subordinates her. Male supremacy itself creates the relationship of power in the context 
of which pornography is subordination and is practiced as abuse. Under the ordinance, 
discrimination through pornography by assault, coercion, forcing or trafficking need not 
be discrimination in, for example, housing or employment in order to be actionable. Indi-
anapolis Gen. Ordinance, § 16-3(g)(4)-(7). An additional power relationship, such as that 
between employer and employee or landlord and tenant, is unnecessary to create the 
conditions under which one person, a woman, is subjected to another, a man. 
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who sought to join, was the exclusion of a woman on the basis of 
sex. The words said: You are excluded because you are a woman, 
and, consequently, women were excluded. The words themselves 
were a practice of discrimination, and their impact, one might 
say their "communicative impact",t23 was to discriminate.124 
Discrimination in employment is, similarly, done primarily 
through words. Consider, for instance, the words, uttered by a 
person with the power to make promotions: "We're giving the 
promotion to Dick instead of to you [a woman] because we be-
lieve this is a man's job. Dick, you're the new district manager. 
Congratulations. "1211 Without more, Dick is the district manager, 
and the company has practiced sex discrimination. Although it 
is true that Dick gets to move to the bigger office, and gets a 
bigger paycheck, and gets to tell more people what to do than he 
did before, the words themselves were discrimination. Laws that 
regulate discrimination, therefore, regulate what those who dis-
<;:riminate may say. 
The law recognizes in other instances that "speech", in the 
form of words, pictures or expressive conduct, is a practice of 
discrimination. For instance, the National Labor Relations 
Act126 prohibits employers from speaking critically of unioniza-
tion in a way that coerces employees during the organizing pe-
riod before a union election. In doing so, it defines such speech 
as an unfair labor practice.127 Such speech is an unfair labor 
123. See infra text accompanying notes 178-181. 
124. This would be true even if the Jaycees had reversed their policy the following 
day, having done nothing but say that a woman could not join. The reversal of the policy , 
might have mitigated damages by ending future discrimination; it would not have un-
done it from the time it occurred. 
125. Although the words used now, in many places, are more subtle and coded than 
those in the text, employment discrimination is done, nonetheless, in words. In the hypo-
thetical in the text, the words are the means of making the promotion and, therefore, are 
the act of discrimination. If a promotion is not effective until, for instance, the board of 
directors has taken a vote, or the president has written a letter stating that Dick is pro-
moted, or the secretary or personnel department notes the promotion in company 
records, the promotion, and so the discrimination, is nevertheless done in words. Each of 
the acts by which the promotion might be made is an act done through words. 
126. National Labor Relations Act, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
127. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (1) to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 
157 of this title .••. (c) The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or 
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, 
shall not consitutte or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the 
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practice because it operates, in the context of the unequal power 
of employers and employees, as coercion, as a threat.128 The fact 
that the prohibited employer speech is speech does not make it 
any less an unfair labor practice.129 Nor does the fact that it is 
speech mean that it is not also coercion. Similarly, pornography 
is subordination and, as such, is a practice of sex discrimination, 
without regard to whether it is also speech.130 
Congress has defined as discrimination advertising racial, 
sexual and other preferences in housing.131 The same statutory 
section declares it unlawful to "represent to any person because 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any dwelling is 
not available ... when [it] is in fact so available", or, for profit, 
to "induce ... any person to sell or rent any dwelling by repre-
sentations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the 
neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin."l32 Similarly, Congress has cre-
ated a cause of action for any person injured by two or more 
persons who conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the 
premises of another, for the purpose of depriving another of the 
equal protection of the law or equal privileges and immunities 
under the law. ISS Advertisements, representations and induce-
provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal 
or force or promise of benefit. 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (c). See also McIntyre, Femininst 
Ethical Approaches, supra note 121, at 21. 
128. See McIntyre, Feminist Ethical Approaches, supra note 121, at 19-20, 21-22; 
See also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-618 (1969). 
129. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). 
130. If a man rapes a woman, although the act is expressive of the woman's subordi-
nation, it is also, in itself, subordination. If he films it, to produce pomograhy making 
the abuse coercion under the ordinance, the production of the film and its subsequent 
distribution and consumption deepens the injury. The camera does not tum abuse magi-
cally into speech and not abuse. Linda Marchiano who, as Linda Lovelace, was coerced 
into making the pornographic film Deep Throat, said: "[E]very time someone watches 
that film, they are watching me being raped." Hearings, supra note 9, at 16. 
131. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982) provides: 
[I]t shall be unlawful ••• 
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, 
printed or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, 
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates 
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin, or an intention to make 
any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), (e) (1982). 
133. 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (1982). 
25
Seator: Pornography
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
322 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:297 
·ments are done with words, pictures or expressive conduct. Con-
spiracy is done in words and when the Ku Klux Klan wears dis-
guises on the highway, their acts are expressive. These civil 
. rights statutes recognize that words, pictures and expressive 
conduct - "speech" - are practices of discrimination. They are 
constitutional.l34 
Pornography is a practice for another reason. It is a practice 
because its definition in the ordinance describes what it does in 
the world. Pornography subordinates women through pictures 
and words. Seen through the lens of sex discrimination law, and 
in the context of social reality, what pornography does consti-
tutes what it is. l311 Pornography is discrimination as employer 
speech that carries a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit is an 
unfair labor practice in the context of a union organizing drive, 
and as a racially discriminatory advertisement for the sale of a 
dwelling is race discrimination. Such employer speech coerces; 
such advertising discriminates. In a similar fashion, pornography 
is discrimination because, and only when, it subordinates on the 
basis of sex. 
It is a legal conclusion that something is pornography under 
the ordinance, as it is a legal conclusion that something is ob-
scenity under the statutory and case law of obscenity. To say 
that pornography is not a practice of sex discrimination would 
be like saying that obscenity is not material that the average 
134. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 
U.S. 934, reh. den. 413 U.S. 923; United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. 
Supp. 870, 872-873 (D.C. Ga. 1973). 
135. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 329. The Seventh Circuit said that "[i]f pornography 
is what pornography does, so is other speech." [d. What follows this sentence in the 
court's opinion is a statement of a series of harms, some of which are massive harms, 
that the court said, or said others believe, are the effects of speech. [d. at 329-330. The 
court apparently believed that the ordinance defines pornography as what pornography 
does only because harm results from its production and consumption. This assumption 
avoided the question how pornography actually functions in the world. The court simply 
asserted and assumed that it functions as Hitler's speeches, the advocacy of communism, 
religion, television and seditious libel - a mixed bag by any standard. The court pro-
ceeded as though the only argument that pornography is a practice of discrimination is 
that it does massive harm. Although the harm of pornography is part of the argument 
that it is a practice of sex discrimination, the way pornography functions in the context 
of male supremacy, the manner in which it does the harm it does in a context of unequal 
power, is essential to the understanding of pornography as sex discrimination. The 
court's equation leaves out the social reality of male supremacy in which pornography is 
what it does. 
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person, applying contemporary community standards would 
find, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, that de-
picts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fin~d by applicable law, and that, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
value.136 Under the ordinance, whatever is not a practice of sex 
discrimination is not pornography. The definition of pornogra-
phy as subordination is, on one level of its legal meaning, the 
requirement that only that which is discrimination can be por-
nography under the ordinance. That something is or is not dis-
crimination would be subject to proof in each case. 
Pornography is a practice also because it is the repetition of 
a limited number of discrete and recognizable formulae.13'1 One 
of the prime attacks by opponents of the ordinance has been 
that the ordinance covers too much. Some opponents have as-
serted that the ordinance would reach virtually all of the world's 
art and literature, much of which is sexist and takes the point of 
view that women are men's inferiors.13s These arguments fail to 
apply the statutory definition to the work that assertedly would 
fall within pornography's definition.139 These arguments also fre-
quently are stated as first amendment absolutist hyperbole.140 In 
136. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
137. Brief of Andrea Dworkin, Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 12-13. 
The statutory definition of pornography in the Ordinance, far 
from being "vague", delineates the structure of actual, con-
crete material produced and sold as pornography by the $8-
billion-a-year industry. No adult bookstore has any problem 
knowing what to stock. No consumer has any problem know-
ing what to buy. No pornography theatre has any trouble 
knowing what to show. The so-called books are produced by 
formula, and they do not vary ever in their nature, content, or 
impact. They cannot be confused with the language of any 
writer I have ever read, including Jean Genet and Jerzy 
Kosinski, who are particularly graphic about rape and hate 
women. 
ld. (citation omitted). 
138. See, e.g., Emerson, Reply to Professor MacKinnon, supra note 101, at 131-132. 
139. The technique that those who make this error use is to apply one or, sometimes 
two, of the three parts of the definition of pornography and, often, to ignore that what is 
actionable are acts: assault, coercion, forcing and trafficking. See, e.g. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 
at 328. 
140. See, e.g., Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 330. In the discussions of the anti-pornography 
ordinance, the absolutist argument appears to play on anxiety about the loss of relatively 
unrestricted sexual access to women. "First Amendment absolutism was forged in the 
crucible of obscenity litigation. Probably the most inspired expositions, the most pas-
sionate defenses of First Amendment absolutism, are to be found in Justice Douglas's 
dissents in obscenity cases." MacKinnon, Feminist Ethical Approaches to the First 
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factt the definition of pornography in the ordinancet developed 
as a description of the materials trafficked in an identifiable in-
dustryt describes a limited genre of materialst far more limited 
than any statutory or common law regulation of any arguably 
"speechH category. 
FinallYt pornography is a practice because it is subordina-
tion. Trafficking in pornography is trafficking in subordination. 
This is true in the sense that pornography actively subordinates 
women andt thereforet is a practice of sexual subordination. It is 
true also in the sense that the product that is trafficked is 
woments subordination. Pornography is commercially and sexu-
ally valuable in part because it is woments sexual subordination. 
What the consumer of pornography buys when he buys pornog-
raphy is woments subordination made into and sold as sex. 
Anti-union employer speech in the context of a union or-
ganizing drive is words. Seen through the lens of labor relations 
law and social realitYt it is also an unfair labor practice because 
it coerces employees. Segregation is a practice of race discrimi-
nation and a symbol of white supremacy. The exclusion of 
women from the Jayceest done through wordst with the exclu-
sion itself justified as expressivet is sex discrimination. The com-
Amendment, supra note 121 (remarks of Catharine A. MacKinnon at 5-6). In consider-
ing the anti-pornography ordinance, otherwise clear-thinking people - including lawyers 
who know how to read statutes - lose the ability to distinguish a civil law from a criminal 
law, remedies from prohibitions, an act from a thought and a law based on discrimina-
tion from an obscenity law. It appears that the thought of losing relatively unrestricted 
sexual access to women prompts an hysteria that clouds clear thinking. 
In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit asserted that if speech and practices that "influence 
the culture and shape our socialization", including "racial bigotry, anti-semitism, vio-
lence on television, [and) reporters' biases", are restricted, all freedom is lost. 771 F.2d at 
330. This statement was presented as argument, when it is mere assertion of a legally 
and factually incorrect proposition. In fact, the first amendment and substantial rights of 
speech coexist with defined and limited restrictions on speech and expressive practices. 
If to permit any restriction on speech and practices that shape the culture is to become a 
totalitarian regime, the United States, in addition to its other shortcomings, already is. 
The absolutist rhetoric that surrounds the first amendment gives rise to a unique form of 
argument that would not be tolerated in other contexts. Why is the argument not made, 
and accepted, that to permit any deviation from equality will turn one portion of the 
society into the abject slaves of another? Why is there no fear of the slippery slope from 
inequality to slavery? How does the value placed on equality differ from that placed on 
speech such that the thought of undermining equality does not raise a spectre of harm 
comparable to that raised by the thought of restricting, in a carefully defined and limited 
way, what has been accepted as "speech"? See Brief of Andrea Dworkin, Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 110, at 14-16. 
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pany promotes a man over a woman because he is a man by say-
ing the words that he is promoted. By saying those words, it has 
discriminated. Pornography is words and pictures, and also a 
practice of sex discrimination done through words and pictures. 
IV. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND THE SUBORDI-
NATION OF WOMEN 
The Seventh Circuit held that the anti-pornography civil 
rights ordinance is unconstitutional because it discriminates on 
the basis of viewpoint. The court said: 
Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit 
speech is "pornography" or not depending on the 
perspective the author adopts. Speech that "sub-
ordinates" women and also, for example, presents 
women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or rape, or 
even simply presents women in "positions of ser-
vility or submission or display" is forbidden, no 
matter how great the literary or political value of 
the work taken as a whole. Speech that portrays 
women in positions of equality is lawful, no mat-
ter how graphic the sexual content. This is 
thought control. It establishes an "approved" 
view of women, of how they may react to sexual 
encounters, of how the sexes may relate to each 
other. Those who espouse the approved view may 
use sexual images; those who do not, may not.l4l 
141. 771 F.2d at 328. The errors in this quotation are symptomatic of the errors that 
the court made throughout its opinion. The court assumed that pornography is speech, 
without coming to grips with its definition as sex discrimination. The court treated sub-
ordination as though it were a "perspective", as though to subordinate a woman is sim-
ply to adopt an attitude toward or idea about her. The court failed to consider all three 
elements of the definition of pornography, proceeding in its analysis as though one or 
two of the elements were sufficient, and misstating elements that it included. The court, 
in the second quoted sentence, omitted the "graphic sexually explicit" element of the 
definition. In its apparent attempt to paraphrase subsections (I), (2), and (6) of the defi-
nition of pornography, the court omitted the requirement that women be "presented as 
sexual objects." The court in this passage treated the law as a prohibition, stating that 
under the ordinance speech is "forbidden", and failing to recognize that the ordinance 
creates remedies for proven harm. The court referred to the absence of a term protecting 
pornography deemed to have literary or political value, as though the standards of ob-
scenity law apply to the ordinance. It contrasted pornography as defined with "[s]peech 
that portrays women in positions of equality" (emphasis supplied), as though the differ-
ence between pornography and portrayals of equality were the difference between one 
image or portrayal and another, rather than the difference between a practice that subor-
dinates on the basis of sex and a portrayal that does no such thing. Again proceeding as 
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It is an important first amendment principle that the govern-
ment may not discriminate between speech or speakers based on 
its agreement or disagreement with the ideas expressed, sup-
pressing the expression of some ideas but not others.142 From 
this principle, the outlines of a doctrine, recently named the 
"viewpoint discrimination" doctrine,143 have been drawn: the 
state may not enact regulations that are "in fact based on the 
desire to suppress a particular point of view"/44 or that are "im-
permissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point 
of view."145 
The viewpoint discrimination doctrine must be distin-
guished at the outset from three things it is not. It is not a doc-
trine that limits regulation of all speech that expresses a view-
point. All,. or virtually all, speech expresses, implicitly or 
explicitly, a viewpoint. So does much conduct, including acts of 
discrimination. The question, however, is not whether the regu-
lated speech expresses a point of view, but whether the regula-
tion is based on, or aimed at, the viewpoint expressed. Thus, for 
instance, most time, place and manner restrictions on speech146 
regulate speech that expresses a viewpoint. They are not for that 
reason viewpoint regulations. The regulation of child pornogra-
phy is harm-based rather than viewpoint-based.147 This is true 
although child pornography legislation is content regulation, and 
although child pornography expresses the point of view that sex-
ual activity is natural and beneficial and enjoyable for children. 
Only if the regulation is aimed at the suppression of the point of 
view expressed is the law viewpoint-based. 
Second, the viewpoint doctrine is not a doctrine that limits 
though the ordinance must meet the standards of obscenity law, which no party or ami-
cus argued that it does, the court objected to the law because it does not distinguish 
among materials on the basis of how sexually graphic they are. Disregarding the actual 
terms of the statutory definition, the court treated it as though it defined pornography as 
"speech", "thought", a "view", and treated the law as though it "controlled", "approved" 
and "disapproved" speech, thoughts, or view points. 
142. See, e.g., Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 
(1972). 
143. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3454 
(1985); Perry Ed. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 49, n.9 (1983). 
144. 105 S. Ct. at 3454. 
145. ld. at 3455. See also 460 U.S. at 49, n.9. 
146. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
147. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
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regulations that express a viewpoint. Virtually all laws express 
points of view. Regulations that prohibit the posting of bill-
boards, for instance, express the point of view that communities 
should be protected from visual blight.148 Securities regulation 
expresses the point of view that persons should be protected 
from fraud and misrepresentation in the purchase and sale of 
securities. Obscenity law expresses the viewpoint that only cer-
tain sex should be seen in public. Sex discrimination law, when 
effective in subverting male supremacy, expresses the point of 
view that women should not be subordinated to men on the ba-
sis of sex. Such laws are not, for that reason, impermissibly 
viewpoint-based. 
Third, the viewpoint discrimination doctrine does not look 
at the effects of the regulation in question but, rather, at the aim 
or motive of the regulation. It is a limitation on regulations 
aimed at the suppression of, or motivated by the desire to sup-
press, particular points of view. The doctrine requires proof of 
discriminatory motive.149 Discriminatory motive can be deter-
mined by assessing the degree of "fit" between the regulation 
and the end, unrelated to the aim of suppressing speech, that is 
asserted to justify the regulation. l50 If harm is asserted as a jus-
tification, it is necessary to assess the reality and severity of the 
harm. In order to determine, as Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. 
& Educ. Fund llH and Perry Ed. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' 
Assn.11S2 require, whether the legislature in fact acted to discrim-
inate against a particular point of view, it is necessary to assess 
the purpose of the legislation and to determine whether the reg-
ulation is narrowly drawn to achieve it.11S3 Where the purpose of 
the legislation is to remedy harm, the reality and severity of the 
harm and the fit of the regulation to the harm are measures of 
motive. 
Pornography, as defined in the civil rights anti-pornography 
148. See Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). 
149. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3454-55; Perry Ed. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49 ("There is, 
however, no indication that the School Board intended to discourage one viewpoint and 
advance another."); Id. at 50, n.9 ("[T]here is no indication in the record that the policy 
was motivated by a desire to suppress PLEA's views."). 
150. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3455. 
151. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985). 
152. Perry Ed. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
153. Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3454; Perry Ed. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49-51. 
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ordinance, expresses a point of view: that women are, and should 
be, sexually subordinate to men. That pornography expresses 
the view that women are properly sexually subordinate to men is 
not a reason to protect or to regulate it, any more than the point 
of view expressed in other discriminatory practices are reasons 
to protect or regulate them.154 The ordinance also expresses a 
point of view: that the sexual subordination of women is sex dis-
crimination. It is the fact that pornography expresses a view-
point that the Seventh Circuit reacted to when it said that 
"graphic sexually explicit speech is 'pornography' or not depend-
ing on the perspective that the author adopts."llSlS It is the point 
of view that the ordinance expresses that the court decried when 
it said that the ordinance "establishes an 'approved' view of 
women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, of how the 
sexes may relate to each other."11S6 Pornography takes a view-
point, as does the ordinance. The ordinance does not, therefore, 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint or "establish an 'ap-
proved' view of women"/1S7 or amount to "thought control."11S8 
Unless the ordinance is aimed at the suppression of a particular 
point of view, or is motivated by a desire to suppress a particu-
lar point of view, it is not viewpoint-based. 
In Hudnut, there was no evidence that th,e ordinance was 
. motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point of view.lIS9 
The ordinance is motivated by the desire to remedy the harms 
of sexual abuse and subordination, not by the desire to suppress 
a viewpoint or idea. The notion that the harm of pornography is 
the harm of an idea or viewpoint is a notion informed by the 
point of view of those who are at very little risk of suffering sex-
ual abuse and subordination. It is a notion informed by the 
point of view of those who cannot comprehend the realities of 
154. In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit treated pornogr&phy's expression of the point 
of view that women are sexually subordinate as a reason to protect it and to prohibit its 
regulation. 771 F.2d at 329. 
155. ld. at 328. 
156.ld. 
157.ld. 
158.ld. 
159. The courts, plaintiffs and some amici asserted and assumed such a motive. 
They did not attempt to prove it. The question whether the ordinance is viewpoint dis-
crimination, in fact, was not litigated. The Seventh Circuit raised the issue sua sponte 
and decided it without the benefit of briefs or argument. Important constitutional issues 
affecting important questions of public policy are not properly treated in such a cavalier 
fashion. 
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lives lived under conditions of sexual subordination in which 
sexual abuse is endemic and ordinary. As the legislative record 
demonstrates, the ordinance fits the harm at which it aims. The 
legislative record establishes pornography's harm through the 
. testimony of women who have been coerced into pornographic 
performances,160 who have had pornography forced on them at 
homel61 and at work/62 and of women and men whom men have 
forced to perform sexual acts that have been sexualized through 
pornography.16s The record also provides supporting accounts by 
workers at rape crisis centers/64 battered women's shelters/65 
and mental health facilities,166 of incest survivors and their ther-
apists,167 and of women who have been used in prostitution.16s 
Experimental research and social studies also predict many of 
these results and document their occurence.169 
As the legislative record clearly shows, and as was uncon-
tested in the litigation, the reason for the ordinance's existence 
is to provide a remedy to women, and also children and men, 
harmed through pornography. Harm is also its constitutional 
justification. If women were not harmed by pornography, the or-
dinance could function only as viewpoint discrimination. If 
women were not harmed by pornography, the ordinance would 
be, as the Seventh Circuit held it is, rather than a regulation to 
remedy harms to women injured through pornography, a regula-
tion through which the state favored one viewpoint over 
another. 
The Seventh Circuit, while purporting to accept the legisla-
tive record and finding of harm,170 wrote an opinion that ren-
dered the harm invisible. The court's treatment of the ordinance 
as viewpoint discrimination is a product of its failure to actually 
160. Hearings, supra note 9, at 13-16. See also L. LOVELACE & M. GRADY, ORDEAL, 
supra note 61. 
161. Hearings, supra note 9, at 43-45. 
162. Id. at 50-52. 
163. Id. at 37-39, 66-67. 
164. Id. at 71-72. 
165. Id. at 67-71. 
166. Id. 72-73, 74, 75-77. 
167. Id. at 81-83, 85-86, 89-90, 99. 
168. Id. at 46-49. 
169. See generally, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL AGGRESSION (N. Malamuth & E. Don-
nerstein, eds. 1984). See also Hearings, supra note 9, at 4-12, 19-20. 
170. 771 F.2d at 329. 
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see, and write a decision sensitive to, pornography's demon-
strated harm. The court erased the harm by ·its failure to mea-
sure the motive of the law by reference to the severity of the 
harm revealed in the legislative record, and by reference to the 
fit between the harm and the regulation. To see the law as view-
point discrimination is to render invisible pornography's demon-
strated harm. 
The fact that words, pictures or expressive conduct -
"speech" - does harm that depends, in part, on the "content", 
meaning, or "communicative impact"l71 of the speech does not 
imply necessarily that the words or pictures do their harm 
through the commmunication and effect of an idea. Consider, 
for instance, blackmail. Blackmail is done in words. It is not the 
time, place or manner of the words that is regulated when black-
mail is criminalized. The same is true of bribery, conspiracy, 
perjury, treason and other similar crimes. Securities regulation, 
for instance, regulates what must and what may not be said in a 
prospectus. The law of fraud and misrepresentation regulates 
what people may say, the content of their speech. These laws do 
not regulate ideas, although they do regulate speech based on 
the meaning of what is uttered. They regulate, and are aimed at 
the harm of, words used in particular contexts as communication 
for particular purposes. They are aimed at the harm of the use 
and effect of words used as bribery, conspiracy, perjury, treason, 
fraud, or blackmail, not at ideas. They are aimed, like the anti-
pornography ordinance, at the harm of words or pictures that 
derives from their existence as something other than, or in addi-
tion to, their existence as ideas, and to their functioning to per-
suade, advocate, argue or simply express. The Supreme Court 
has referred to these harms, which are done through words but 
are not the harm of ideas, as "unique evils that the government 
has a compelling interest to prevent."172 
Similarly, the anti-pornography ordinance is aimed, not at 
the ideas expressed by pornography, but at sex-based subordina-
171. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 580-
584. 
172. Roberts v. United States Jaycees,.468 U.S. 609,628 (1984) ("[A]ct of invidious 
discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advan-
tages cause unique evils that the government has a compelling interest to prevent -
wholly apart from any point of view such conduct may transmit."). 
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tion and abuse. Although pornography is expressive - expressing, 
for example, the viewpoint that women are sexually subordinate 
whores who love and deserve rape - the expression of this view-
point is only one part of the way pornography exists and func-
tions in the world. The expression of the viewpoint, and any 
harm done through its expression, is not what the ordinance is 
aimed at regulating. The law targets subordination in the defini-
tion of pornography, and targets abuse by limiting actionable 
harm to that done, not by ideas, but by assault, coercion, forcing 
and trafficking in subordination through pornography. Subordi-
nation, assault, coercion, forcing and trafficking are not ideas: 
they are unique evils that the government has a compelling in-
terest to prevent. 
Other examples of comparable regulations exist in the law. 
For example, the law prohibiting employers from speaking criti-
cally of unionization in a way that coerces or threatens employ-
ees in the organizing period before a union election does not vio-
late the first amendment. 173 The law permits pro-union 
employer speech; it forbids anti-union employer speech. It is, 
therefore, content-based. It is not, however, viewpoint-based in 
the first amendment doctrinal sense unless it is aimed at the 
suppression of an anti-union viewpoint. It is not viewpoint-
based if it is aimed at the harm of something else, something 
other than the persuasive impact of the words. 
In the case of threatening anti-union employer speech, the 
something else is coercion. The government is aiming not at the 
viewpoint expressed by employer speech, but at the harm of co-
ercion. The regulation of anti-union employer speech during an 
election is justified by the fact that the speech does not operate 
to persuade by the logic, eloquence or truth of the viewpoint ex- . 
pressed: it "persuades" by coercion, operates as a threat, pro-
vokes compliance through instilling fear, all in a context of une-
qual power.174 
173. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618·619 (1969). Professor Sheila 
MacIntyre made this argument in Feminist Ethical Approaches, supra note 121, at 18-
25. See also Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 4 DUKE L.J. 589, 613 
(1986). 
174. McIntyre, Feminist Ethical Approaches, supra note 121, at 19-20. 
[Llawmakers recognize that employers have the power to ef-
fect what they utter in speech: The labor boards understand 
that when the union is defeated in the election following an 
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In context, the speech is coercion. It is not, therefore, pro-
tected speech. Its harm, in context, is not its persuasive force, 
but its coercive force. Viewpoint-based regulation aims at what 
is advocated and at the effects accomplished by persuasion, at 
the harm of an idea. The labor law forbidding employer speech 
promising a benefit or threatening reprisal in the context of an 
election, like the anti-pornography ordinance, is aimed at a dis-
tinguishable harm, at something else: coercion or, in the latter 
case, assault, coercion, forcing or trafficking in sex-based subor-
dination. As the employer speech in question is, in the particular 
context of unequal power, coercion, pornography, as defined by 
the ordinance, and in the context of male supremacy, is subordi-
nation. It operates by subordinating, as the prohibited employer 
speech operates by coercing. It is actionable when used to abuse, 
as employer speech is prohibited when used to threaten. Al-
though in each case the speech may operate, in part, through the 
expression of a viewpoint, the regulations in question do not aim 
at or reach it for that reason. 
Subordination and the related harms of pornography are in-
tertwined with the expression of the viewpoint that women are 
subordinate, so that, in pornography, women are subordinated 
through a practice of sex discrimination while the pornography, 
simultaneously, expresses the viewpoint that worp.en are sexually 
subordinate to men. Subordination is done through words and 
pictures, but it is done nonetheless. 
In first amendment jurisprudence, the doctrine that regula-
tions, with certain limited categorical exceptions, may not be 
aimed at the harm or danger of ideas is stated as the doctrine 
that the state may not regulate the "communicative impact" of 
"speech."171i This "doctrine is, apparently, the doctrine that the 
7th Circuit called on when it invalidated the ordinance because 
it concluded that the harm of pornography is done through 
"mental intermediation."176 Although the communicative impact 
anti-union employer speech, it is not because employees were 
persuaded by the logic of the employers' words about unions, 
but because they were persuaded by fear for their livelihoods. 
Nor is it because they are moved by the employer's passionate rhetoric. 
175. See generally L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 44, at 580-
584. 
176. 771 F.2d at 329. 
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doctrine is an important first amendment doctrine, it is stated in 
a manner that obscures its actual outlines and application, and 
that is insensitive to the actual operation of expression. 
First, as shown above, the doctrine is not applied to bribery, 
conspiracy, blackmail, perjury, treason and other similar crimes 
done through words, although such acts are done through the 
communicative impact of words. Certainly, the first amendment, 
until the Hudnut decision, had not been used to invalidate dis-
crimination laws, although much discrimination is done through 
words and all is expressive,I77 and although discrimination con-
structs to a significant degree the social meaning and conse-
quences of gender. The words through which discrimination is 
done operate through their meaning, their communicative im-
pact, both in the sense that the words, by virtue of their mean-
ing, are discrimination and in the sense that things happen as a 
result of the meaning of the words, the content of the speech. 
The law of sex discrimination regulates the communicative im-
pact of speech and the harms flowing from communicative 
impact. 
Second, the statement of the communicative impact doc-
trine is founded on an insufficiently analyzed concept of commu-
nicative impact. The doctrine forms the foundation of the argu-
ment that the ordinance is invalid because it is aimed at the 
harm of an idea. According to this argument, any viewpoint-
based regulation can be stated as a regulation based on harm.178 
The danger of such speech, the danger regulated by the ostensi-
bly harm-based laws, the argument proceeds, is the danger of 
loathsome speech to have its way in the marketplace of ideas.I79 
In this view, the harm regulated by any law regulating the com-
municative impact of speech is the harm of an idea or a 
viewpoint. 
By this argument, implicitly adopted by the Seventh Circuit 
in Hudnut, the court erased the real and demonstrated harms of 
abuse and subordination that are inextricably intertwined with 
the production and consumption of pornography. This argument 
177. See supra section III. 
178. See, e.g., Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, 9 
MARv. J. L. & PUB. POL. 461, 467 (1986). 
179. See, e.g, 771 F.2d at 329-330. 
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assumes that the only harm that flows from the communicative 
impact of expression is the harm of persuading listeners to an 
odious viewpoint. It assumes that if a regulation aims at com-
municative impact, it aims at an idea or a viewpoint that the 
government believes is not only wrong, but dangerous. Thus, it 
is said that the restriction of speech based upon its "communi-
cative impact" is restriction based upon "a fear of how people 
will react to what the speaker is saying."lSO The phrase "a fear of 
how people will react to what the speaker is saying" obscures 
how speech actually functions. What is an employer saying when 
she says to employees during a union organizing drive: "If we 
just. cooperate and try to get along together, we'll all be a lot 
better off than if we have to fight this thing out the hard way, 
maybe lose jobs or have to close down the shop?" What is the 
"communicative impact" of this speech? In one sense, what the 
speaker communicates are the ideas, thoughts or viewpoint she 
conveys, the position she advocates, the logic of her words. In 
another sense, she communicates a threat. In a context of une-
qual power and coerced compliance, the "viewpoint" communi-
cated cannot be separated from the threat. [Both are the "com-
municative impact" of the "speech."] References to the 
"communicative impact" of speech, to "what the speaker is say-
ing", therefore, are highly misleading when they fail to distin-
guish between the operation of words as persuading through the 
force of ideas and the impact of communication through the 
force of something else: coercion, for instance, or abuse and sub-
ordination. The harm reached by the anti-pornography ordi-
nance, and similar regulations is not the harm of an idea. lSI 
An analysis of the use of words and pictures to abuse and 
subordinate or coerce, rather than to persuade or advocate 
through the expression of an idea, is necessarily sensitive to so-
180. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 111 (1980). 
181. The law has engaged, in obscenity law, in a fruitless search for the harm of 
obscenity. Historically, the "harm" of obscenity has been showing sex that should not be 
seen, particularly to unwilling viewers and to children. See Baldwin, The Sexuality of 
Inequality, supra note 4, at 633-634. Now, with the widespread public display and avail-
ability of pornography, sexually explicit materials can .be reached under zoning laws. See, 
e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986). The harm of pornography is 
something quite different from the searched for, imagined and selective "harms" of ob-
scenity, and the devaluation of property values addressed by zoning laws. The harm of 
pornography is not the harm of an idea or an image; it is not "offense"; it is the harm of 
sexual abuse and subordination. 
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cial context and social reality. Such an analysis cannot assume 
that words function simply to express ideas and, therefore, that 
any regulation of the "communicative impact" of words is regu-
lation of ideas, of thought. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing CO./52 the 
Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relation Act's re-
striction on threatening employer speech during a union election 
through a consideration of the context of the speech, particu-
larly the context of the relative power of employers and 
employees: 
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer 
expression, of course, must be made in the con-
text of its labor relations setting. Thus, an em-
ployer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of 
the employees to associate freely, as those rights 
are embodied in [the NLRA]. And any balancing 
of those rights must take into account the eco-
nomic dependence of the employees on their em-
ployers, and the necessary tendency of the for-
"mer, because of that relationship, to pick up 
intended implications of the latter that might be 
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested 
ear.183 
The decision of the Seventh Circuit in Hudnut is neither 
sensitive to the context and reality in which pornography exists, 
particularly the context of sex-based power, nor aware that por-
nography's impact, its subordination of women, is not the effect 
of ideas. 
The error in the line of argument that all content-related 
harm done through words or pictures is the harm of the idea or 
viewpoint expressed derives in part from the failure to consider 
context. It is the failure to understand how speech functions in 
reality, rather than in the theoretical marketplace of ideas.184 It 
182. 395 u.S. 575 (1969). 
183. [d. at 617. 
184. The phrase "marketplace of ideas" itself demonstrates its deficiencies. It makes 
the unfounded assumption that all that is at issue when words or pictures are at issue is 
ideas. It is as though speech, in the world, takes place as, and only as, a contest of view-
points, disembodied, divorced from social reality; as though speech can be reduced to 
logical propositions and the propositions compared in the abstract to determine which is 
true. It is as if the process of the creation of truth and social reality were the process of 
the competitive interaction of ideas, and may the best syllogism win. 
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derives in part from the assumption that words, or all communi-
cation, operate as pure thought, as though they were pure idea, 
existing out of context and unrelated to social reality. The anal-
ogies used to make the argument take pornography out of con-
text and strip it of social reality. 
The Seventh Circuit, for instance, analogized the ordinance 
to a regulation that would prohibit films critical of Republicans 
but not those critical of Democrats.I81> In this analogy, the 
speech regulated is nothing but the pure expression of a view-
point. The analogy erases harm and subordination. It erases con-
text. It erases reality. The regulation in the court's example is 
clearly a violation of the first amendment. There is simply no 
justification for the regulation of films critical of Republicans ex-
cept viewpoint discrimination. The analogy is an attempt to 
make the ordinance something it is not. If the ordinance made 
actionableI86 films that advocated women's sexual subordination, 
it would be analogous to the court's hypothetical regulation.I8? 
185. 771 F.2d at 33l. 
186. The court used the word "prohibit", again failing to make the basic distinction 
between the enactment of a prohibition and the creation of a legal remedy. In formulat-
ing the analogy, it also ignored that what is actionable under the ordinance are acts, 
assault, coercion, forcing and trafficking, which are done in part through words. See In-
dianapolis Gen. Ordinance, § 16-3(g)(4)-(7). 
187. Compare Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959) ("What 
New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because 
that picture advocates an idea - that adultery under certain circumstances may be 
proper behavior.") Argument in opposition to the ordinance that fails to distinguish ad-
vocacy of an idea, including any supposed "harm" or "danger" of such advocacy, from 
the harms of abuse and subordination done through pornography by assault, coercion, 
forcing and trafficking finds expression in Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as View-
point Discrimination, supra note 178. In that comment, the author analogized the ordi-
nance to a law that prohibits "any publication that may persuade listeners to refuse 
induction into the army", asserting that the hypothetical law is a "harm-based" statute. 
ld. at 466 (emphasis supplied). He asserted the unquestionably true proposition that the 
hypothetical law is viewpoint discrimination. The analogy to the ordinance, however, 
misleads by erasing harm, by treating the ordinance as a regulation of the advocacy of an 
idea, and by failing to analyze the concept of "communicative impact" on which the 
argument relies. ld. at 467. The argument of the comment as a whole is tautological: it 
states the terms of the ordinance as though it were a regulation of the harm of an idea -
which is, by definition, viewpoint discrimination - and concludes, therefore, that the or-
dinance is viewpoint discrimination. "Harm" in the comment's argument means the dan-
ger of an idea. The comment even uses the word "persuade" in the draft hypothetical, 
making the argument a perfect circle. If the ordinance defined pornography as words or 
pictures that persuade viewers that women are subordinate, the analogy would be good 
and the ordinance would be viewpoint discrimination. The comment makes the analogy 
by distorting and misrepresenting the actual terms of the ordinance, and by failing to 
comprehend the harm of sexual abuse and subordination at which the ordinance aims. 
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The court treated the ordinance the same as it would have 
treated a similar law that defined pornography as the sexually 
explicit "equalization" of women that also included descriptions 
of mutual sex premised on equality. Harm and the public policy 
pursuant to which sexual equality is identified as a compelling 
state interest did not figure in the court's decision. If the harm 
of pornography were not demonstrated in the legislative record, 
and if sex equality were not a compelling state interest, the 
court's conclusion that the law is viewpoint discrimination would 
be correct. Pornography's harms, the harms of abuse and subor-
dination, and the fact that the law is properly a sex discrimina-
tion law - a conclusion that the 7th Circuit did not contest - are 
the reason for the ordinance's existence and the argument for its 
constitutionality. The court distorted and gutted the law in or-
der to conclude that it is unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination. ISS 
The court did not identify the element of the law that it 
concluded was viewpoint discrimination. It cannot be the "sexu-
ally explicit" portion of the definition, for regulation of sexually 
explicit speech has not been treated as viewpoint-based.ls9 The 
six descriptions of the content of pornography cannot be the 
viewpoint element. Although they are a content element, they 
are not viewpoint-based. Those elements could appear, for in-
stance, in a work criticizing pornography and arguing for 
women's equality. Such a work would not have the viewpoint of 
pornography, although it contained one or more of the six de-
scriptions. It can only be that the court was treating the subor-
dination element of the definition of pornography as viewpoint 
discrimination. Rather than recognizing that the ordinance is a 
sex discrimination law, and, therefore, not viewpoint discrimina-
tion, the court used the fact that it is a sex discrimination law to 
conclude that it is viewpoint discrimination. 
188. A comparison of the ordinance with the effort to stop the Nazis from marching 
in Skokie, Illinois similarly guts the ordinance by erasing the fact that it is a civil rights 
law. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) was posed as Hudnut was decided, as 
simply a speech case, and not a civil rights case. Collin could have been posed as a civil 
rights case with a potentially different result from the one the court reached. See 578 
F.2d at 1204, n.13 ("It bears noting that we are not reviewing here a law which prohibits 
acts designed to impede the equal exercise of guaranteed rights .... If we were, we would 
have a very different case.") (Citations omitted). 
189. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). 
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All acts of sex discrimination have. a viewpoint: women are 
inferior to and should be subordinate to men. All acts of race 
discrimination take the point of view that Blacks, or members of 
another racial group, are inferior to whites and, therefore, should 
be subordinate to whites. Laws against sex and race discrimina-
tion take a different viewpoint, a viewpoint favoring equality. If 
the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Hudnut were even-
handedly applied to all discrimination law, all discrimination 
law would violate the first amendment. All sex discrimination 
laws, that are effective as such, aim at practices that contribute 
to the social acceptance of the belief that women are inferior to 
men as they construct a world in which, in fact, women are sub-
ordinated to men. In, for instance, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Commn. on Human Rights,190 the court upheld a law that 
prohibited sex-segregated employment advertisements. The law, 
like many laws regulating sex discrimination in employment, 
took the viewpoint that the workforce should not be sex-segre-
gated. It was not invalid, any more than Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964191 as a whole is invalid, because it legislates 
an "approved view" of women in the workforce.192 Although the 
law regulated the use of words - the publication of words in 
newspapers - it was not "thought control", but a sex discrimina-
tion law. Similarly, the law of sexual harrassment regulates 
words, pictures and expressive conduct. In, for instance, Katz v. 
Dole,193 the court held that the verbal sexual harrassment to 
which the plaintiff was subjected in her employment was a prac-
tice194 of sex discrimination. The fact that the discrimination 
was done through words, in the form of "sexual slur, insult and 
innuendo" and through "sexually related epithets addressed to 
and employed about" the plainti:ff191S did not result in the con-
clusion that the harrassment was speech and, therefore, not a 
practice of discrimin~tion, nor that its regulation violated the 
first amendment.196 
190. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
192. See Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 21, Hudnut, 106 S. Ct. 1772 (1986). 
193. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). 
194. [d. at 254. 
195. [d. at 253. 
196. See Brief of Andrea Dworkin, Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 18-19. 
All any exploiter has to do is to interject speech into any prac-
tice of exploitation, however malignant, and hide the whole 
practice behind the First Amendment. By isolating the speech 
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In the dominant liberal ideology, the central harm of sex 
discrimination is that it reinforces and rests on "archaic and 
overbroad generalizations"l97 about women and "stereotyped 
characterizations of the sexes. "198 Archaic stereotypes are ideas 
about women. They are, in fact, presumptively false ideas about 
women. That the central dynamic of sex discrimination is seen, 
in liberal ideology, to be its reliance on false ideas of women has 
not resulted in the conclusion that sex discrimination law is a 
violation of the first amendment. The fact that the harm of sex 
discrimination is done in part by creating, affecting or reinforc-
ing beliefs about or perceptions of women's inferiority does not 
mean that discrimination law violates the first amendment, or 
that it is "thought control"l99 or the "legislation of an approved 
view of women. "200 The ordinance reaches practices that 
subordinate women and, as such, does not require a determina-
tion whether any particular view of women is true or false. In 
liberal ideology, a practice of sex discrimination is a practice 
that embodies, relies on, or assumes a false view of women.201 It 
is ironical that a sex discrimination law that makes subordina-
tion and abuse actionable, and that does not depend on judg-
ments of what is true and false about women, should be held to 
be thought control and the legislation of an approved view, when 
sex discrimination laws that, under liberal theory, depend on 
elements in other practices of discrimination and asserting 
their absolute protection, the discrimination can be made to 
disappear. Consider, for example, a common situation in sex-
ual harrassment in employment, where a "speech" element - a 
sexual proposition from a supervisor - is part of a chain of 
events leading to an adverse employment consequence .... No 
court has held that the mere presence of words in the process 
of discrimination turns the discrimination into protected 
activity. 
Rape is not a viewpoint, either, although it expresses a viewpoint, and is part of 
what socially constructs women and men as such. "To be rapable, a position which is 
social, not biological, defines what a woman is." MacKinnon, Toward Femininst Juris-
prudence, supra note 4, at 651. In the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Hudnut, there-
fore, and particularly if the rapist says anything while he is in the act of raping, laws 
against rape would violate the first amendment. 
197. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). 
198. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 333 (1977). 
199. 771 F.2d at 328. 
200. [d. 
201. In the liberal theory of sex discrimination law, a woman must show that she is 
similar to a man in relevant respects in order to recover for sex discrimination; she must 
show that what is true of men is true of her. See generally, MacKinnon, Difference and 
Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 4, at 32-45. 
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judgments concerning what is true and false about women 
should be upheld. 
In the liberal theory of sex discrimination, the law permits 
persons to hold stereotyped notions about women, and to say 
them. The law imposes liability, however, for discriminating 
against women, including through words,202 based on those 
archaic beliefs. Under the ordinance, one may believe and say, 
for instance, that women love rape, and are properly sexually 
subordinate to men. The ordinance does not require that anyone 
adopt or express any particular viewpoint on women. Under the 
ordinance, it is a defense that the materials merely express an 
idea about the subordination of women. It is a question of fact 
in each case whether the material in question actively,subordi-
nates, or merely expresses the viewpoint that women are and 
should be sexually subordinate. People remain free to say, for 
instance, that women love to be beaten and raped, so long as 
they do not practice sex discrimination by assault, coercion, 
forcing or trafficking in subordination through pornography.203 
The ordinance requires simply that persons who injure others by 
acting in specified ways in the production, distribution and con-
sumption of pornography compensate the victims for their acts 
of sex discrimination, and that they stop injuring th~m in this 
way henceforth. Like any discrimination law, the anti-pornogra-
phy ordinance regulates discrimination as dis~rimination, and 
not as speech. This is true even though the discrimination may 
be done partly, or primarily, in words or pictures or both, and 
even though it may be expressive conduct. . 
In the decision of the Seventh Circuit, pornography's harm 
is not seen as real; it is not seen as important. The court saw the 
harm as a mere pretext for discrimination on the basis of view-
point because it did not see the harm as sufficiently serious to 
justify the regulation. If the court had seen the harm as real and 
important, it would not have concluded that the legislature was 
202. See supra section III. 
203. The regulation of employer speech, for instance, is limited to speech that func-
tions as a threat, that coerces, as the ordinance is limited to materials that subordinate 
when used to abuse. In Gissel, the Court distinguished the operation of speech to express 
an idea from its operation as a threat: "Thus, an employer is free to communicate to his 
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a 
particular union, so"long as the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or 
force or a promise of benefit.''' 395 U.S. at 618. 
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acting to suppress a viewpoint. If the court had seen the harm as 
real and important, it would have seen that the law is directed 
against a serious, even monumental, harm, not against an idea or 
a viewpoint. If one sees no harm, or trivial harm, and, therefore, 
nothing substantial to aim at but viewpoint, one sees the law as 
aimed at viewpoint. Despite its lip service to the severity of the 
harm, the Seventh Circuit erased the harm in a contest of view-
points. The court apparently saw the ordinance as posing ques-
tions of right and wrong, true and false: What is the correct view 
of women's sexuality? What is good sex and what bad? The or-
dinance does not pose those questions. The court failed to ad-
dress the questions the ordinance actually posed to it: Is pornog-
raphy simply an idea? Is the harm of pornography the harm of a 
dangerous idea? Does the harm of pornography justify a law 
that provides redress to those proven tp be harmed in specified 
ways through its production and consumption? Is it unconstitu-
tional to provide a remedy for sex-based abuse and subordina-
tion that is done in part through pictures and words? What is 
the significance of the legislative finding that pornography is a 
practice of sex discrimination? 
The court decided Hudnut as though it were a contest be-
tween individual rights of free speech and the government. It 
did not seriously consider the civil rights of women and their 
violation through pornography to be at issue.204 The court con-
sidered the constitutionality of the ordinance as though the 
harms for which it would provide a remedy all happen in some-
one's mind and body. The someone, of course, is the male con-
sumer of pornography. The view that the real events caused by 
pornography are the events in the mind and body of the male 
consumer is the view of obscenity law. It is also the porno-
graphic view. In that view, men, men's minds, and men's erec-
tions and orgasms are real. Women are invisible except as ideas 
or fantasies that occasion male erection and orgasm. The view 
that pornography is thought, idea - an event in the mind of the 
male consumer - or fantasy - a mental or other event that occa-
204. Despite the serious standing and Article III case or controversy issues the de-
fendant raised, the constitutionality of the ordinance was litigated in a case without a 
plaintiff who asserted injury through pornography. The plaintiffs postured the case as an 
abstract contest between individual rights to free speech and the government. The ab-
sence of a woman plaintiff asserting injury through pornography is one aspect of the 
erasure of women and harm to women in the litigation. 
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sions male erection and orgasm - is one aspect of the way that 
the pornographic view, and the view instutionalized in the law 
according to Hudnut, render women and harm to women 
invisible. 
In the Seventh Circuit's decision, to subordinate a woman is 
simply to say something, to express an idea. The court assimi-
lated the harm of pornography to its viewpoint, ignoring, in the 
process, the real harms, that are not thoughts, to real women, 
who are not ideas. The court assimilated a practice of sex dis-
crimination to protected speech, as though nothing happens but 
the expression of an idea when a woman is subordinated and 
abused by pornography through assault, coercion, forcing or 
trafficking. The court treated the ordinance as though it were 
not a remedy for real harms to real women. It is as though the 
court saw the ordinance as providing a remedy against ideas 
about or views of women. The struggle, in the court's view, is 
between ideas, not against women's abuse and subordination. 
V. SOCIAL REALITY AND PORNOGRAPHY'S HARM 
In life, the harm of pornography is obscured because what is 
done to those harmed - principally women - is consonant with, 
even c~nstructive of, what it means to be a woman.20G The harm, 
if perceived at all, is not perceived as serious and political, but 
as trivial and personal. The harm is obscured because the fact 
that a woman was abused is proof that her abuse was appropri-
ate to her status and definition.206 Pornography eroticizes domi-
nance and submission, it sexualizes inequality and abuse. Be-
cause pornography's harm is sexual harm to women, it is 
205. See generally, A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 4; MacKinnon, An 
Agenda for Theory, supra note 4; MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra 
note 4. 
206. The belief that victims are, by definition, appropriate victims is applied to all 
those victimized by relegation to second class social status. It applies principally to 
women, particularly to sexual victimization of women. Women ask for and deserve rape, 
battery, and sexual harrassment; women's sexual nature is expressed in pornography; 
women like it. The attitude rests in part on the assumption that things are as they ought 
to be, so that those who are hurt are appropriately hurt; those who are victimized are 
victimized because they were, even before the victimization, metaphysically or psycho-
logically victims. This position is often stated as the conclusion that there will always be 
rape, battery, pornography, prostitution - as though sexual abuse is one of the inevitable 
costs of being a woman like death from traffic accidents is one of the inevitable costs of 
automobiles. It has the ring of a justification, if not a hope. 
46
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss3/1
1987] PORNOGRAPHY 343 
obscured. The harm itself is sexualized, and is perceived, not as 
harm, but as pleasure. Because pornography, its harm, and 
women, are seen from the point of view that pornography is cen-
tral in constructing, its harms are not perceived or, when per-
ceived, are trivialized.207 
The real harm of pornography, its harm to women and chil-
dren, and also men, received little recognition in the Hudnut de-
cisions and some commentary on the ordinance. Although pur-
porting to leave the legislative findings of harm undisturbed, 
both the district court and the Seventh Circuit erased the sexual 
use and abuse that is inseparable from pornography's produc-
tion and consumption. Both courts erased the social and sexual 
reality in which pornography is a practice of sex discrimination, 
in which pornography is trafficking in women. Some commenta-
tors, while paying lip service to the harm of pornography, have 
found it irrelevant to whether pornography may be regulated.20B 
Others assert that pornography has not been shown to do the 
harm established in the legislative record.209 Pornographers have 
been in the forefront of this line of argument, writing it, publish-
ing it, and giving money to those who say it.210 
207. See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, supra note 4, at 7-8 
("What a woman is, is defined in pornographic terms; this is what pornography does. If 
. the law then looks neutrally on the reality of gender so produced, the harm that has been 
done will not be perceived as harm. It becomes just the way things are."). 
208. See, e.g., Emerson, Response to Professor MacKinnon, supra note 101, Stone, 
Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint Discrimination, supra note 178. 
209. See, e.g., Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Com-
mission: New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 27 
(1986). 
210. Pornographers' comments on the effort to establish that pornography harms 
women include Nobile, The New Frigidity, FORUM at 61 (June, 1986). Pornographers 
also publish the comments of others on the civil rights anti-pornography movement. See, 
e.g., Petersen, Politically Correct Sex, PLAYBOY at 67 (Oct. 1986); Nobile, Interview: 
Varda Burstyn, FORUM at 13 (September, 1985). The American Civil Liberties Union 
and its affiliates have been both outspoken advocates for pornographers and their finan-
cial beneficiaries. The ACLU opposed legislation against child pornography, and opposed 
the civil rights anti-pornography ordinance (which includes remedies for children injured 
through pornography). The offices of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union is housed in a 
building owned by Ferris Alexander, a major local pornographer, where it is reported to 
have paid little or nominal rent. The Playboy Foundation has been a contributor to the 
ACLU, and it is reported that ACLU affiliates in San Diego, California, Los Angeles, 
California, and Iowa City, Iowa have shown pornography, including Deep Throat, at fun-
draising events. Attorneys who have been employed by the ACLU and its affiliates have 
represented pornographers as private counsel. Economic interest is widely understood to 
affect people's thought, behavior and loyalties. Sexual interest, although less widely un-
derstood, operates similarly. 
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The harm of pornography, both in the abuse of individual 
women, children and men, and as a practice that subordinates 
women as a group, failed to inform the courts' decisions in the 
litigation on the constitutionality of the anti-pornography ordi-
nance. The problem was not that the harm is not serious. It is. 
The problem was not that the harm was not demonstrated. It 
was, by any reasonable and generally accepted standard of dem-
onstration. The problem was that the harm is a sexual harm 
done principally to women. The erasure of the harm is a product 
of the social invisibility of sexual harm to women, and of the 
application of legal method and doctrine in a manner that failed 
to comprehend sexual harm, that is, harm to women as women. 
Erasing the harm was crucial to the decision of the Seventh Cir-
cuit that the ordinance is viewpoint discrimination. It was cru-
cial to the determination of the district court that speech inter-
ests outweigh equality interests. And it is crucial to the failure 
to understand pornography as a practice of sex discrimination; 
as trafficking in women; as real harm to real women and as the 
subordination of women. 
The decisions of both courts turned women into speech, 
erasing real women as they protected the "right" to harm 
women as freedom of speech. The decisions of both courts in 
Hudnut obscured that the decisions protect a system of traffick-
ing in women. What Hudnut says, when it is applied to the 
world, is: trafficking in women is protected by the constitution. 
The decisions, which turn women into speech, replicate the 
pornographers' view of the process of the production of pornog-
raphy. In the decisions of the Hudnut courts, the picture that is 
the product of the sexual use of a woman is separated from the 
process of its production, abstracted from the trafficking in 
women that is pornography, identified as words or pictures and 
protected as "speech." From the pornographers' point of view, 
once the sexual use or abuse of a woman is photographed, the 
woman becomes irrelevant and the picture becomes real. In this 
view, one can protect the picture without harming the woman; 
one can harm the woman through the picture without the pic-
ture losing the protection the first amendment affords speech. In 
this view, trafficking in pornography is not trafficking in the 
women, children and men from whom or about whom or to facil-
itate the sexual use of whom the pornography is made. In the 
production, distribution and consumption of pornography, and 
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under the decisions in Hudnut, women are the speech of the 
pornographers.211 
The recent litigation over the constitutionality of the civil 
rights anti-pornography ordinance is not the first time the law 
has failed to comprehend that a practice of discrimination is a 
practice of discrimination.212 Before the Court held in Brown v. 
Board of Education213 that racial segregation in education harms 
Black children by "denoting their inferiority",214 the law did not 
perceive segregation to be race discrimination.2115 When Profes-
sor Wechsler asked the question whether the validity of Brown 
depended on the evidence that segregation harms Black chil-
dren, he, in part, questioned whether segregation in education 
was not beneficial to Black children.216 Expert opinion varied. 
White children might be painfully hostile to Black children in 
integrated schools; maybe Black children felt secure in their own 
schools; maybe some Blacks would choose segregation.217 
Wechsler asked these questions as he argued for judicial de-
cision-making freed of interest, politics and the desire for re-
sults, and as he argued for a bright line between fact and princi-
ple. Neutrality, he believed, resided in principle, reason and 
abstraction. Principle, reason and abstraction, as such, are 
cleansed of social reality. What is true in principle, in the ab-
211. Brief of Andrea Dworkin, Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 238. 
[I]n pornography, acts done to or by women are called 
"speech", even though the woman is doing an act dictated by 
what is required to sexually gratify men. Her body is a com-
modity in itself. Her body is also the literal language of the so-
called publisher, who in reality is a pimp trafficking in women. 
Because the pimp introduces a camera into the trafficking, his 
whole process of exploiting the woman's body is protected as 
"speech." 
212. The Hudnut litigation and the public debate surrounding the ordinance and its 
enactment also are not the first time that sexual abuse has been called an idea or a 
sexual fantasy. See J. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD's SUPPRESSION OF THE 
SEDUCTION THEORY (1984). 
213. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
214. Id. at 494. 
215. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Brown, the Court for the first time 
held that it "must look to the effect of segregation itself on public education." 347 U.S. 
at 493. Before Brown, it had found inequality of "tangible" factors between segregated 
schools. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
216. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 104, at 33. 
217. Id. at 32-33. 
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stract, is true in all possible worlds.218 In some other world, seg-
regation might not be an institution of white supremacy and 
anti-miscegenation laws might not be discrimination against 
Blacks.219 In this world, they are. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson,220 the Supreme Court held that seg-
regation is race discrimination only if Blacks "choose to put that 
construction upon it. "221 Consistent with Wechsler's approach, 
the Court decided Plessy as though social reality did not exist, 
as though there were only isolated acts and individual responses. 
Wechsler realized precisely that the construction to be put upon 
the acts is the issue: whose interpretation of the acts will define 
them in law?222 How, Wechsler asked, can one measure the va-
lidity of state imposed segregation? By the way Blacks interpret 
it? That interpretation, it went without saying, is not neutral. It 
is from the point of view of Blacks that segregation is subordina-
tion, is an injury. That interpretation is not law. The harm, if 
any, existed, in the view of the Court in Plessy and in Wechs-
ler's view, in the heads of Blacks, not in reality. For the Court in 
Plessy, as for Wechsler, the idea that the interpretation of 
Blacks, of the powerless, defined reality was unthinkable. The 
idea that Black reality could be institutionalized in law did not 
need argument to refute it: the question whether to use the in-
terpretation of Blacks to measure the validity of the law, Wechs-
218. In Plessy, the Court stated that segregation laws "do not necessarily imply the 
inferiority of either race to the other." 163 U.S. at 544 (emphasis supplied). What is 
necessarily true is true in principle, without reference to the world as it actually is. In 
contrast, in Brown, the Court looked to the actual effect of segregation on Black children 
and public education. 347 U.S. at 493, 494. 
219. Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 104, at 33-34. In that world, the lan-
guage used in the text to describe it would not exist. 
220. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
221. Id. at 551. 
222. Compare MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 652: 
What is wrong with rape is that it is an act of the subordina-
tion of women to men. Seen this way, the issue is not so much 
what rape "is" as the way its social conception i~ shaped to 
interpret particular encounters. Under conditions of sex ine-
quality, with perspective bound up with situation, whether a 
contested interaction is rape comes down to whose meaning 
wins ••.. The problem is this: the injury of rape lies in the 
meaning of the act to its victims, but the standard for its 
criminality lies in the meaning of the same act to the assail-
ants. Rape is only an injury from women's point of view. It is 
only a crime from the male point of view, explicitly including 
that of the accused. 
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ler apparently believed, answered itself.223 
The law cannot both comprehend social reality and main-
tain a bright line between fact and principle. Principle, which is 
assumed to be neutral precisely because it is not informed by 
social reality, will take on the cast of the decision-maker - his or 
her viewpoint, values, experience and politics - unless the deci-
sion-maker is informed and bases decision in part on social real-
ityas seen from viewpoints other than the viewpoint institution-
alized in law. Arguments make sense, conclusions appear true or 
false, based not only on pure logic, but on one's interest and ex-
perience, one's point of view.224 To the extent that the realities, 
experience and point of view of the litigants fail to make their 
way into judicial decision-making, the only point of view inform-
ing the decision is that of the decision-maker (as a person) and 
that institutionalized in law.225 Such "neutrality" is neither neu-
tral, nor capable of comprehending social power and social 
powerlessness, and so of achieving actual equality.226 
223. See Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 104, at 33. 
Is it alternatively defensible to make the measure of validity 
of legislation the way it is interpreted by those who are af-
fected by it? In the context of a charge that segregation with 
equal facilities is a denial of equality, is there not a point in 
Plessy in the statement that if "enforced separation stamps 
the colored race with a badge of inferiority" it is solely be-
cause its members choose "to put that construction upon it?" 
Does enforced separation of the sexes discriminate against fe-
males merely because it may be the females who resent it and 
it is imposed by judgments predominantly male? (Citation 
omitted). 
The intended reductio - the suggestion that race segregation is not discrimination be-
cause it has something in common with the imposition of male judgments on women -
fails. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 140-141 (1979). 
224. Legal reasoning, in any case, operates principally by analogy. See Levi, An In-
troduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948). Same and different are 
informed by one's interest and experience to a greater extent than is a syllogism. 
225. They are likely to be the same, both because of the demographies of those sit-
ting on the bench, and because those sitting on the bench are carefully schooled in the 
point of view institutionalized in law. 
226. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
[T]he problem with neutrality as the definition of principle in 
constitutional adjudication is its equation of substantive 
powerlessness with substantive power and calling treating 
these the same, "equality." The neutrality approach under-
stands that abstract systems are systems, but it seems not to 
understand that substantive systems are also systems. 
See also C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT, supra note 264, at 126 - 27, 140. The 
phrase "actual equality" is derived from Lahey, The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
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The legal method that Wechsler counseled, and that the 
Hudnut courts, each in its way and however imperfectIy,227 ap-
plied is one founded on abstraction. The Hudnut courts simply 
categorized pornography as "speech", proceeding as if the task 
were to make law about the thing - most abstractly, "speech", 
most concretely, words or pictures - that they abstracted, cate-
gorized and labeled, rather than to make law for the conduct of 
human relationships in the world. Rather than seeing the com-
plex world of social reality, seeing speech as embedded in the 
world that gives it meaning, both courts abstracted and catego-
rized pornography as speech, treating it as though it exists as a 
value without reference to context and reality. In the opinion of 
the district court, the process of categorization divorced the 
speech interests from the equality interests by abstracting both 
from social reality. The Seventh Circuit simply assimilated 
equality interests to speech interests. In both opinions, the reali-
ties of particular circumstances became the abstract categories 
created by the manner in which the courts used legal method 
and doctrine. 
Wechsler identified result oriented judicial decision-making 
as the central evil of insufficiently abstract principles.228 To seek, 
or applaud, a particular result is to abandon principle and neu-
trality for politics. What Wechsler's analysis obscures is that the 
method he approved determines, to a significant extent, out-
come. The method that Wechsler applied in his analysis of 
Brown would determine the outcome in that case. Wechsler, and 
the law, could not comprehend segregation as a practice of race 
discrimination when the practice was abstracted from social re-
ality and the issue was posed as the abstract question whether 
separate but equal was equal. Similarly, in the Hudnut litiga-
tion, the courts abstracted from the reality of pornography's 
production and consumption. Neither court wrote a decision 
that comprehended and adequately responded to the world so 
clearly revealed in the legislative record, a world in which por-
nography is trafficking in women. Consequently, real women and 
real harm were rendered invisible, and the courts failed to un-
derstand the analysis of pornography as a practice of sex dis-
Pornography: Toward a Theory of Actual Gender Equality. supra note 4. 
227. See supra section II. 
228. Wechsler. Neutral Principles. supra note 104. 
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crimination through which women, and also children and men, 
are subordinated and abused. By their manner of employing the 
process of abstraction through categorization, the courts turned 
women into abstractions, into ideas, and made law about noth-
ing but "speech." 
The failure of the Hudnut courts to recognize pornography 
as a practice of sex discrimination, although not contesting the 
legislative finding that it is, and the decision that the ordinance 
violates the first amendment, touch fundamental questions of 
the construction of social reality, its comprehension in law, and 
the possibility of using law as a tool for achieving women's 
equality. In liberal first amendment jurisprudence, "speech" op-
erates in a "marketplace of ideas", where the power of speech is, 
ultimately, the power of truth.229 The point and purpose of 
speech is to get ideas accepted as true because they are true. 
This analysis obscures, among other things, the complex rela-
tionship between the construction and definition of social reality 
and what is accepted as true. It fails to account for the way the 
"free marketplace" looks to those without the power to define 
the terms of the exchange. For those whose viewpoint defines 
reality, the power to impress their viewpoint on the world is, as 
they see it, the power of true ideas. When what one thinks is 
imposed upon the world and defined in the process of the impo-
sition as true, it appears that what is imposed prevails because it 
is true, because of the power of "speech", the power of words as 
such. From the point of view of those with the power to define 
reality, the male point of view that is institutionalized in, among 
other things, law,230 the force of the imposition is invisibile, ex-
cept as the force of ideas. To those who define reality, its defini-
229. The metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas" is familiar from an often-cited 
passage in the dissent of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1939): 
But when men [sic] have realized that time has upset many 
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ul-
timate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -
that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
230. See, Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S LJ. 83 
(1980); MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 4: MacKinnon, Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, supra note 4. 
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tion is merely a statement of ideas, true if and to the extent that 
it conforms to an independently existing reality. To those on 
whom the definition is imposed through all available forms of 
social power, it is imposed as the definition of reality because it 
is the way others see, with their interests and from their view-
point. From the viewpoint of the relatively powerless, the view-
point of the powerful is imposed as it is said. From the view-
point of the powerful, the viewpoint of the powerless is 
interpretation, which is neither reality nor a viewpoint that is 
institutionalized in law.231 Those who define reality stand within 
their viewpoint and defend "speech", as though in defending 
power as speech they are not defending power. Because those 
with the power to impress their viewpoint as reality see the pro-
cess of this imposition as the power of speech, it appears that 
whatever constructs reality must be ideas and their expression: 
"speech. " 
This analysis makes sense of the otherwise puzzling state-
ment of the 7th Circuit in Hudnut that pornography's power to 
do the harm it does demonstrates that it is protected speech.232 
From the point of view of those who are deprived of power as 
women, pornography is targeted because it is an organized and 
powerful institution of male supremacy. It is because pornogra-
phy is trafficking in women, a practice that eroticizes male domi-
nance and women's subordination and through which women, 
and also children and men, are sexually abused, that it should be 
made actionable as sex discrimination. Under the 7th Circuit's 
231. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
Having power means, among other things, that when someone 
says, "this is how it is," it is taken as that way .... Speaking 
socially, the beliefs of the powerful become proof, in part, be-
cause the world actually arranges itself to affirm what the 
powerful want to see. If you perceive this as a process, you 
might call it force, or at least pressure or socialization or what 
money can buy. If it is imperceptible as a process, you may 
consider it voluntary, or consensual, or free will, or human na-
ture, or just the way things are .... Powerlessness means that 
when you say "this is how it is," it is not taken as being that 
way. This makes articulating silence, perceiving the presence 
of absence, believing those who have been socially stripped of 
credibility, critically contextualizing what passes for simple 
fact, necessary to the epistemology of a politics of the 
powerless. 
Compare Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 104, at 33-34. 
232. 771 F.2d at 329. 
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Hudnut decision, it is that same fact, stated as the power of 
speech to get itself accepted in the marketplace, that identifies 
pornography for first amendment protection. From the point of 
view embodied in the ordinance and, under the decision of the 
7th Circuit, from the point of view institutionalized in law, por-
nography constructs social reality. According to the decision in 
Hudnut, pornography is speech - thought, idea, image - because 
it constructs reality.z33 From the viewpoint of women and the 
anti-pornography ordinance, reality is not constructed by 
thought or idea, but by political and sexual realities, including 
pornography.z34 
233. [d. 
234. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 4, at 19. 
[T]he experience of the (overwhelmingly) male audiences who 
consume pornography is therefore not fantasy or simulation or 
catharsis but sexual reality, the level of reality on which sex 
itself largely operates . _ .. The way in which the pornography 
itself provides what those who consume it want matters. Por-
nography participates in its audience's eroticism through cre-
ating an accessible sexual object, the possession and consump-
tion of which is male sexuality, as socially constructed; to be 
consumed and possessed as which, is female sexuality, as so-
cially constructed; and pornography is a process that con-
structs it that way. 
One often-stated defense of pornography is that it is "harmless fantasy." The argu-
ment is: pornography is harmless because it is fantasy. The reality is: pornography turns 
women and harm to women into fantasy. Real women and harm to real women are oblit-
erated twice over in pornography. Women, whose social existence is as object, See gener-
ally MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 4, exist in pornography as fantasy 
object: twice removed from personhood. You can't harm a fantasy; you can create it, 
make a representation of it and get off on it. The ideology that says pornography is not 
harmful because it is fantasy is the ideology of pornography. 
It is because male viewers are aroused by pornography that it is defined as fantasy_ 
(Male viewers set the standard, not because similar, or complementary, fantasies do not 
affect women's sexuality, but because women's fantasies do not form the definition of 
what is erotic. Sex, including pornography, is defined by a male standard of what is 
arousing. Women's sexuality is defined by, and is not definitive of, that standard.) The 
relationship between sex and fantasy is not: this is fantasy and men get off on it. It is: 
this is fantasy because men get off on it. Fantasy is the thought, writing, act or picture of 
what men want sexually. It is what is in men's minds when they orgasm. It is also the 
acting out in the world of what is in mens' minds when they orgasm. The line defining 
fantasy is not a line between thought and act. Fantasy is, by definition, whatever turns 
men on sexually; it is also, by definition, harmless. This definition of fantasy as equated 
with harmless and as equated with what turns men on sexually explains, in part, why the 
harm to women through pornography is rendered invisible. See Brief of Andrea Dworkin, 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 110 at 3 ("The actions immortalized in pornography are not 
ideas, thoughts, or fantasies. The vocabulary of "sexual fantasy", often applied to por-
nography as a genre, is in fact the language of prostitution, where the act that the man 
wants done and pays to get done is consistently referred to as his "fantasy", as if it never 
happens in the real world."). In the analysis of pornography from the point of view of 
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Under the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Hudnut, the 
first amendment is a tool of male hegemony, including the he-
gemony of the male point of view. The first amendment protects 
social reality as it is constructed, because reality, in the liberal, 
idealistic philosophy reflected in the decision of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, is constructed of ideas. In the decision of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, the first amendment protects pornography as such because 
pornography constructs social reality. If the process of the crea-
tion of social reality is confused with the process of thought, 
then a regulation that moves against male supremacy at the 
level of the construction of social reality will be seen to violate 
the first amendment. 
It might seem that the effect of such an approach would be 
even-handed and fair because it would apply neutrally and sym-
metrically to invalidate those regulations that challenge and 
those that legislate the male point of view. The court's treat-
ment of the subordination element of the law as viewpoint dis-
crimination, however, reveals the bias· of the neutral viewpoint 
as applied to determine the outcome in Hudnut. The world to 
which law applies is a world of unequal power in which women 
as a group are subordinated to men as a group; it is not a sym-
metrical world of gender-neutral persons. The law has recog-
nized this inequality, and recognized it as something to change, 
by recognizing sex equality as a compelling state interest in the 
law of sex discrimination.235 A law that realizes the compelling 
state interest in sex equality does not simply express one point 
of view. By treating a sex discrimination law as the legislation of 
a viewpoint, the Hudnut court ignored both the reality of une-
qual power and the existing law of sex discrimination in which 
sex equality is a compelling state interest. If sex discrimination 
law did not exist, if pornography were harmless, and if pornog-
raphy were not a practice of sex discrimination, the ordinance 
would be viewpoint discrimination. It would also be pointless 
and unnecessary. To treat an asymmetrical world as though it 
women and underlying the civil rights ordinance, pornography is sexual reality. 
235. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). One strand of sex 
discrimination law recognizes inequality by recognizing the systematic subordination of 
women as the harm of sex discrimination. The other strand, which is insensitive to the 
realities of power and to women's systematic subordination, sees the harm of sex dis-
crimination as the harm of making inappropriate differentiations. See generally, MacK-
innon, Difference and Dominance, supra note 201. 
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were symmetrical, ignoring in the process the existing public 
policy in which sex equality is a compelling state interest, does 
not produce even-handed adjudication. It, instead, further insti-
tutionalizes sex inequality. From the "neutral" point of view, 
Plessy's analysis of segregation is right because based on the for-
mal equation of separate but equal with equal, and Brown is 
wrong because based on the interpretation Blacks put upon 
their lives. If the decision in Hudnut is right, subordinate but 
equal is equality for women.236 If subordination is equality for 
women, a decision upholding the ordinance would be wrong be-
cause it would recognize subordination as subordination by un-
derstanding it in the context of social reality as sex discrimina-
tion, not as simply one viewpoint. 
In Hudnut, the Seventh Circuit said that the first amend-
ment prohibits the government from declaring what is true and 
what false.237 If the first amendment is a tool of the hegemony of 
the male point of view, however, it not only does not prohibit 
the government from declaring truth: it is a vehicle for its crea-
tion and declaration. In Hudnut, after stating that the govern-
ment may not declare what is true, the court declared the truth 
of the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas.238 Similarly, the 
court declared the truth of the belief that the enactment of sex-
ual submission in Carnal Knowledge is not "a real sexual sub-
mission."239 The very method and viewpoint of the decision-
236. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 4, at 27-28. 
The harm of pornography, broadly speaking, is the harm of 
the civil inequality of the sexes made invisible as harm be-
cause it has become accepted as the sex difference .... [I]f 
you see women as just different, even or especially if you don't 
know that you do, subordination will not look like subordina-
tion at all, much less like harm. It will merely look like an 
appropriate recognition of the sex difference .... Pornography 
does treat the sexes differently .... [But] the major argument 
does not turn on mistaken differentiation . . . . The salient 
quality of a distinction between the top and the bottom in a 
hierarchy is not difference, although top is certainly different 
from bottom; it is power. So the major argument is: 
Subordinate but equal is not equal. 
237. 771 F.2d at 330-331. 
238. [d. at 330. 
239. [d. The court declared the truth of the point of view that the enactment of sex 
for the camera is not sexual reality to demonstrate that pornography is not sexual real-
ity. In the point of view of the ordinance pornography is sexual reality. Without regard 
to whether Carnal Knowledge is pornography under the ordinance, the court's treatment 
of sexual reality in its comment on Carnal Knowledge casts light on its analysis of por-
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maker is an implicit declaration of truth: the truth of the deci-
sion-maker's viewpoint. The court held the ordinance unconsti-
tutional because it did not comport with the truth as the court 
saw it. That "truth" is that pornography is "speech"; that if 
women sexually submit in front of a camera there is not a "real 
sexual submission"; that the enactment of a law that realizes the 
compelling state interest in sex equality is simply the expression 
and regulation of a viewpoint; that the infliction of sexual abuse 
and subordination is somebody's right, and that their protection 
through law as speech is everybody's freedom. In Hudnut, the 
court not only declared the truth of the male point of view; it 
also precluded the expression in law of the truth that pornogra-
phy harms women. 
Legislation from the male point of view is not seen as from 
a point of view. It is seen as objective. It is because the civil 
rights anti-pornography ordinance is written from the point of 
view of those injured by pornography rather than those who get 
profit and pleasure from it, that the court found it to be view-
point discrimination. Why are obscenity laws not impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination, legislating as they do a view of sex and 
women's bodies as dirty secrets? Why is a rape law exempting 
sex forced on a woman by her husband not impermissible view-
point discrimination, legislating, as it does, an approved view of 
women, marriage and sex in which rape of one's wife is accept-
able? To Wechsler, his point of view, the point of view institu-
tionalized in law, was neutral and objective: truth; the point of 
view of Blacks was interpretation: a point of view. It is when a 
nography. The woman who played a sexually submissive role in the movie was a real 
woman (significantly, nameless in the court's opinion) who on a real movie set before real 
people (no doubt mostly men, or at least those with power were no doubt mostly men) 
really acted out a scene of sexual submission. How did the court determine that there 
was not a real sexual submission in the enactment of the sexual scenes in Carnal Knowl-
edge? Is there a "real sexual submission" when a woman does a burlesque show in front 
of watching men? How is that different from the acting in Carnal Knowledge? If men 
watching the filming of Carnal Knowledge became sexually aroused, was there a real 
sexual submission? Did sexual submission happen, from the male point of view, rather 
than being merely acted out but not really happening, if those viewing the filming were 
aroused? If the actors were aroused? One difference between a burlesque show and a 
movie set where sex is filmed is that a camera is present on the movie set. The camera 
seems to be a magical transformer of real into unreal, so that what happens in the world 
becomes unreal if it is put on film. Perhaps that is so because if a camera is present the 
acting out creates the conditions for real sex: man and picture. In this view, nothing real 
happens when a camera is present; the picture, however, is real. 
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law institutionalizes a point of view different from that ordina-
rily institutionalized in law that it is apparent to those who de-
fine the dominant point of view that there is a point of view at 
all. One sees a point of view as a point of view when it is not 
one's own; one's own point of view seems transparent to the 
world. When one's own point of view is socially accepted as de-
finitive of reality it, no doubt, must become particularly difficult 
to see it as a point of view. 
The civil rights anti-pornography ordinance has a view-
point, which the court recognized as such because it was not its 
own. Because the ordinance expresses a viewpoint that the court 
did not share, it concluded that it is viewpoint discrimination; it 
embodies a point of view seen as such because different from the 
court's own. The ordinance puts the male point of view into 
question, revealing it as a point of view. Because the ordinance 
codifies women's point of view, what is clear from the male point 
of view is, first, that the law has a viewpoint and, second, that it 
is different from the male viewpoint, which is taken to be trans-
parent to and definitive of reality. From the male point of view, 
therefore, what one sees with the enactment of the ordinance is 
an attack on one's point of view; from the point of view of 
women, what one sees is an attack on sexual abuse and subordi-
nation. If pornography is defined as "speech", abuse and subor-
dination become and, under Hudnut, become protected as, 
ideas. 
In the theory of philosophical idealism on which the Sev-
enth Circuit's Hudnut decision rests, a law that strikes at male 
supremacy on the level of its construction of reality strikes at 
ideas. Because pornography constructs reality through the inflic-
tion of sex-based harms, any legal attack on the abuse done 
through pornography also is, under the Hudnut decision, a vio-
lation of the first amendment. If achieving equality for women 
requires a reconstruction of social reality through a reconstruc-
tion of the practices, institutions and ways of life that create so-
cial reality, the first amendment, under the reasoning of the Sev-
enth Circuit in Hudnut, would preclude any attempt to achieve 
equality through the use of law. Under Hudnut, however, one 
can use law to further institutionalize the male point of view. A 
law that is consistent with the dominant view looks like objec-
tive reality to those whose viewpoint is definitive of objectivity 
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and neutrality. Those whose viewpoint is definitive of reality are 
those who, in general, decide what will be law. So long as the 
court rules as though reality were ideas and the abuse of women 
an expression of ideas, a law that strikes at the creation and per-
petuation of a world in which women are subordinated and 
abused as women will be understood, in the language of liberal 
first amendment theory, to "distort public debate." In Hudnut, 
both courts used the first amendment to protect male 
supremacy. 
To defend pornography as speech is to turn women into 
speech by erasing the reality of harm to women; by seeing por-
nography as only speech, and not as trafficking in women; by 
seeing speech, not sex discrimination; by seeing the subordina-
tion of women as the perspective the author adopts; by adopting 
the view that to subordinate a woman is to express an idea. But, 
in reality, "women are not fiags."240 If pornography is protected 
as speech, women are available for sexual use and abuse because 
women are the speech of the pornographers. For women, free 
speech, interpreted to mean, as in Hudnut, that pornography is 
protected by the first amendment, means that women may be 
freely used as speech: if women are the pornographers' speech, 
women's injury by sexual use and abuse through pornography 
may not be made actionable in law. For men, the protection of 
pornography as speech means that they may freely use women 
to speak. 
Why does the court,.and the male point of view institution-
alized in law, turn sexual reality into an idea? Why does the 
court turn subordination into the "perspective the author 
adopts?"241 One answer is that pornography can be protected if 
it is an idea. It can also be exalted, unlike sexual arousal, which 
240. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, supra note 4, at 28-31. 
What unites many cases where speech interests are raised"and 
implicated but not, on balance, protected, is harm, harm that 
counts .... Courts have seen harm in other cases. The ques-
tion is, will they see it here, especially given that the 
pornographers got there first. I will confine myself here to ar-
guing from cases on harm to people, on the supposition, the 
pornographers notwithstanding, women are not flags. 
[d. Women would have fared better in Hudnut as draft cards, with a significance and 
reality beyond symbolic value. See O'Brien v. U.S., 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
241. 771 F.2d 328. 
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is valued and important but cannot be directly protected by the 
first amendment. As speech, sex can be protected by constitu-
tional principle. If sexual practices can be treated in law as 
speech, men remain free to use women sexually. Pornography is 
defined as speech also because of that other pole of power: 
money. The pornography industry in the United States alone is 
an 8 billion dollar per year business.242 If pornography were ac-
tionable as sex discrimination, the business would be at risk. If 
pornography were not sexually and financially valuable to those 
who make and use it, it would be regulated as discrimination 
rather than protected as the expression of a viewpoint.243 
The real marketplace in which pornography exists is not the 
liberal's imagined marketplace of ideas. It is an actual market-
place where women and children are trafficked for sexual pleas-
ure and economic profit. The power that the pornographers 
wield in the marketplace in which pornography exists is not the 
power of ideas or truth; it is the power of sex and money pro-
tected as the power of "speech." The real marketplace is the one 
in which the pornographers have had the economic and sexual 
power to get what they do accepted as speech - to define the 
regulation of pornography as the regulation of speech. The 
method the courts used in Hudnut was the method employed in 
Plessy to protect the system of white supremacy. The result in 
Hudnut, however, is closer to the result in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford: 244 the protection of a system of trafficking in human be-
ings. When pornography is understood for what it is - the traffic 
in sexual abuse and subordination - the law will regulate it as a 
violation of civil rights and will provide remedies for its harms. 
When pornography is understood for what it is - the abuse and 
242. u.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 84-85 (June 4, 1984) 
243. MacKinnon, Social, Legal, and Clinical P~rspectives, supra note 4, at 49. 
The bottom line of all the resistance we encounter to this law 
is that a lot of people, people who matter, enjoy pornography. 
That is why they defend it. This is also why there is so much 
hysteria and distortion over the civil rights approach. The 
worry is not that it would misfire, but that it would fire at all. 
The fear is, it would work." 
244. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See MacKinnon, Social Science, Legal, and Clinical Per-
spectives, supra note 4, at 48·49. 
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subordination of women and children, and also men - male 
supremacy will budge.24G 
245. At a panel entitled "Developing Feminist Jurisprudence" at the 14th National 
Conference on Women and Law (Washington, D.C., April 7-10, 1983), Catharine MacK-
innon said that, when sexual harrassment became actionable as sex discrimination, she 
saw male supremacy "budge." 
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